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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT: A
DEFENSE OF MINIMUM FEDERAL STANDARDS

DOUGLAS R. WILLIAMS*
In 1990, ambient air quality in over 100 American cities fell short of
health-based standards established pursuant to the Clean Air Act, known as
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS).1 In population terms, more
than 112 million Americans were breathing air that posed significant risks to
their health.2 The villain in this pollution story is ground level ozone.
In the ten years since these dim statistics were brought to public attention
and Congress amended the Clean Air Act to address the problem, many urban
areas have made modest progress in reducing ambient concentrations of ozone.
During this period, the number of areas officially considered to be in
“nonattainment” of the ozone NAAQS declined from 101 to 34.3 Nonetheless,
nearly 50 million people live in areas that still do not meet the ozone NAAQS.4
With a bit of luck, many of the areas in which ambient ozone levels
currently exceed the NAAQS may attain the ozone standard sometime before
2005, although that prospect is fraught with uncertainty.5 But if this may be

* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. My thanks to Jeff Lewis for his
encouragement and support, to Connie Wagner for her patience, and to Amy Hoch and Ryan K.
Manger for their unflagging efforts in support of the symposium.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a).
2. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-490, 101st Cong. 146 (1990), reprinted in COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, U.S. SENATE, II A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 3170 (1993). Because of variances in ozone concentrations
within areas, it is likely that the number of persons actually exposed to unhealthy levels of ozone
is somewhat less than the figure cited in the text. Nonetheless, “ozone . . . is . . . the pollutant
most likely to have fairly uniform concentrations throughout an area.” Id. at 3219.
3. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GREEN BOOK HOME PAGE,
CLASSIFICATION OF OZONE NONATTAINMENT AREAS, at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/
onc.html (last visited March 1, 2001) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK].
4. See GAO, Status of Implementation and Issues of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, GAO/RCED 00-72, at p. 9 (2000); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL
AIR QUALITY AND EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT 36 (2000) [hereinafter TRENDS REPORT].
5. This prediction is based on the effects of EPA’s finding that many states contribute
significantly to nonattainment of the ozone standards in downwind states and its requirement that
these upwind states reduce their emissions of nitrogen oxides, which contribute to the formation
of ozone in downwind areas. See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
69 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. March 5, 2001) (No. 00-632).
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regarded as a bit of good news, there is some devastating bad news: the
existing ozone NAAQS is not adequate to protect public health.6 Thus, even
persons living in areas currently deemed to be in attainment of the ozone
NAAQS may be breathing air that poses a significant risk to their health. The
existing ozone NAAQS is set at .12 parts per million (ppm), averaged over a
one-hour period.7 In 1997, EPA revised the standard downward to .08 ppm,
averaged over an eight-hour period. Although the new standard remains under
a legal cloud,8 its primary legal difficulties do not relate to the conclusion that
exposures to ozone in concentrations of less than .12 ppm (the existing
standard) pose considerable health risks to citizens, but rather concern how
much lower than .12 ppm the standard should be set and what sort of
explanation the courts will demand of EPA in justification of the standard.9
Thus, from a public health perspective, air quality is far poorer than is
currently and officially recognized. Approximately 120 million people now
live in areas that currently fail to meet the revised, .08 ppm standard.10
Additionally, eight-hour ozone concentrations in 25 national parks and rural
sites increased during the 1990’s, posing threats to agricultural productivity
and ecosystem health.11 Even assuming that the new eight-hour standard will
eventually be implemented, it is likely to be many more years before that
standard is widely attained. Thus, almost ten years after the passage of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAA), one might very well conclude
that, despite considerable efforts, tens of millions of Americans and the
generations to follow them are fated to breathe unhealthy air.
The extent of continuing ozone nonattainment is troublesome, and not only
because of the associated health risks. In 1990, Congress legislated
aggressively to attack the ozone problem, imposing strict requirements on
ozone nonattainment areas.12 It was anticipated that, once implemented, these

6. See generally EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 2
(July 18, 1997).
7. 40 C.F.R. § 50.9.
8. See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001).
9. The D.C. Circuit had concluded that EPA’s explanation for the new ozone standard
violated the nondelegation doctrine because the agency had failed to identify a decisional
standard that sufficiently constrained the agency’s discretion. American Trucking Ass’n., Inc. v.
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1999). The Supreme Court recently reversed this holding and sent
the case back to the D.C. Circuit for further review. Whitman, 121 S. Ct. at 919.
10. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, LATEST FINDINGS ON NATIONAL AIR
QUALITY: 1999 STATUS AND TRENDS, at 5 (2000).
11. Id. at 8.
12. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7511a. Several scholars have attacked the requirements of 1990
amendments as too stringent. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and
the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority,
Symposium Issue, found and bound in 14 YALE J. REG. 23, 58 (1996) (describing costs of 1990
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requirements would bring most (but not all) areas into attainment before the
beginning of the new millennium.13 It is now clear that Congress
underestimated the difficulties of putting effective pollution control measures
in place, just as it had in 1970 and again in 1977, when it amended existing
legislation to address persistent air pollution problems like ozone.14
This state of affairs focuses critical attention on existing institutional
arrangements for handling air quality problems generally, and ground level
ozone in particular. Much of the critical attention in recent years, however, has
not focused on why we may have failed to secure more widespread attainment
of the ozone standard or how we might better our efforts to do so. Instead,
scholars have begun to question whether it makes for good policy to seek
attainment of the ozone NAAQS in all areas of the country. Some scholars
have concluded that the costs of attaining the standard in many areas dwarf any
benefits we could reasonably hope to gain through more cleanup.
To be sure, this is hardly a new criticism. From their very birth in 1970,
national ambient air quality standards have been attacked as irrational and
grossly inefficient because they ignore variations in the harms associated with
pollution and the costs of pollution control from geographic area to geographic
area. As Professor Krier put it in 1974:
[S]ince the costs of pollution and the costs of control vary across the country, it
is difficult to see how a uniform standard can begin to take the varying costs
into account. The standard that minimizes total costs for a region in Iowa is
hardly likely to do so for all the regions of California or New York or
Colorado as well. To require adherence to the same stringent standard
everywhere will in many areas result in the imposition of control costs which
are much larger than the pollution costs avoided.15

Amendments as “staggering” and concluding that “there is little reason to believe that there will
be a significant return on the resources invested in the process”).
13. After areas were initially classified under the terms of the 1990 CAAA, all but ten urban
areas were expected (and legally obligated to develop plans sufficient) to meet the ozone
NAAQS.
The ten remaining areas were: Baltimore, Philadelphia-Wilmington-Trenton,
Sacramento, and Ventura County, California—which are expected to meet the standard by 2005;
Chicago-Gary-Lake County, Illinois, Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, Milwaukee-Racine, New
York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, and California’s Southwest Desert—expected to meet
the standard by 2007; and, lastly, Los Angeles, whose problems are probably hopeless—expected
to meet the standard by 2010. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 3. The combined population of
these areas is pretty large—roughly 55 million people—but as the text recounts, roughly 80%
more people are exposed to unhealthy levels of ozone than was expected if the 1990 CAAA’s
goals were met.
14. For a brief history of the Clean Air Act and Congress’s efforts to deal with the problem
of nonattainment, see ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR POLLUTION LAW 155-61 (1995).
15. James E. Krier, The Irrational National Ambient Air Quality Standards: Macro- and
Micro-Mistakes, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 323, (1974); see James E. Krier, On the Topology of
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Failure to attain health-based federal standards, on this view, may or may
not viewed as a problem prudently to be solved. It all depends on whether the
costs ozone air pollution imposes on citizens of particular areas are greater or
less than the costs those citizens would have to bear to attain and maintain the
ozone NAAQS. In more general terms, this critique attacks the very idea of
“health-based” air quality standards, implicitly arguing that the purpose of any
air pollution control program should not be to protect public health or the
environment, but rather to “maximize welfare” or to achieve an efficient
allocation of resources by reducing wasteful uses of air resources. “Wasteful”
uses of air resources, on this view, are those that impose greater societal costs
(or yield fewer societal benefits) than competing uses. Thus, in narrow
efficiency terms, dedicating air resources for the use of breathers and to ensure
healthy ecosystems may be wasteful if the aggregate benefits of these uses are
less than the benefits foregone by those who are required in some measure to
limit their uses of air resources as a pollution sink.
If one accepts the initial premise of efficiency-related critiques of federal
standards—that environmental quality is susceptible to meaningful treatment
and analysis as a marketable good that is no different in principle than the
legendary widget—two additional issues must be addressed. First, federal
uniform standards based only on the health effects of particular pollutants are
problematic from an economic perspective only if those standards impose costs
in excess of benefits in one or more areas of the nation to which they apply. If
the federal standard achieves net benefits in areas where pollution control costs
are at their highest, then it cannot be said to be “irrational” to impose that
standard everywhere—so long as the federal standards do not preempt more
stringent local efforts to protect environmental values.
If we assume, however, that uniform federal standards impose costs in
excess of benefits in at least one area in the nation, then a second issue that
must be addressed, but is missing in Professor Krier’s classic criticism of
uniform federal standards, becomes more pertinent. That issue concerns the
appropriate level of aggregation for analysis—i.e., the appropriate area or
analytic unit within which the costs and benefits of air quality standards are to
be assessed and an appropriate regulatory program designed and implemented.
This is an important consideration because the standard that yields the greatest
benefits relative to costs may vary across levels of aggregation. At one
extreme, for example, the costs of pollution control for an individual facility
are very likely to exceed the consequent benefits to that facility. Yet, all would
agree that in this situation the cost-benefit analysis is far too narrowly focused
to inform public policy. More relevant for purposes here, an air quality
Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System—And Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV.
1226 (1995) [hereinafter Topography].
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standard may be net beneficial for the nation considered as a whole, but
impose costs in excess of benefits, perhaps even grossly so, for a particular
locality, state, or other jurisdictional unit.
Professor Krier’s critique assumes that aggregating at the national level is
inappropriate and that the appropriate analytic unit is some geographic area
that is less inclusive than the nation as a whole. While Professor Krier hints
that the states may be a better jurisdictional unit for air quality regulation, he
does not tell us how that conclusion was reached. Given our constitutional
structure, state environmental standards may well represent the most salient
alternative to federal standards. Moreover, there may be efficiency-related
reasons independent of the standards themselves for relying on the states, such
as reducing the costs of creating effective decision-making institutions by
relying on pre-existing institutional structures.
Aside from these
considerations, however, there is no a priori reason to rely on states and
“federalism” as an efficiency-enhancing alternative to federal environmental
regulation.
Clearly, however, arguments for turning environmental regulation over to
the states have increased dramatically in recent years and many of these
arguments are based on the idea that the states should be considered the
“optimum environmental jurisdiction.”16 Invoking notions of federalism, these
arguments are often coupled with a claim that, in the absence of some
compelling justification for federal intervention in the field of environmental
protection, it is the states that should be responsible for determining a desirable
level of environmental quality and for selecting the control measures requisite
to achieving and maintaining that level. The end-point of these arguments is
the same: the federal government should simply bow out or drastically limit
the scope of its regulatory authority.
Critics of federal environmental regulation have concluded that federal
regulation is warranted only if one or more of the following conditions obtain:
(1) a “race-to-the-bottom” in which states, fearing competition from other
states, relax environmental standards to suboptimal levels, and thus sacrifice
social welfare, to attract or retain mobile capital investment; (2) the pollutant in
question generates “interstate externalities”—that is, state regulation of the
pollutant does not ensure that some significant amount of the pollution will not
be transported to other states; (3) economies of scale, such as centralized
research and technological knowledge, are so extensive at the federal level that
they outweigh other, supposed inefficiencies associated with federal
regulation; and (4) public choice problems are greatly more prominent at the
state level than they are at the federal level, effectively permitting favored

16. See Richard O. Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions, 4 ECOL. L.Q. 193 (1974).
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interests to dominate state policymaking.17 Each of these conditions
represents, in now-fashionable terms, a species of “market failure”—an
imperfection in the manner in which “property rights” are defined or the
presence of “transactions costs” that prevent markets from working the magic
of assuring that resources are devoted to their highest valued uses.18 From this
perspective, any notion that a national commitment to environmental quality
can properly be viewed as an attempt to place environmental quality beyond
the reach of market determinism—perhaps because that commitment is viewed
as a moral imperative or that environmental quality is a “right” that all
individuals, no matter where they live, can legitimately invoke—is dismissed
as romantic or worse.19 For proponents of economism, to describe and address
environmental degradation as anything other than a question of how to allocate
resources efficiently is to speak nonsense.
Assaults on federal environmental regulation often are pitched at a high
degree of generality, usually starting from the premise that federal standards
are “uniform,” and therefore, inefficient. A careful review shows that, while
the CAA can plausibly be described as mandating uniform national standards,
17. These justifications are outlined in various places in the scholarly literature. One of
more extensive catalogs is Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as National Good, 1997 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 205-10 (1997). See also William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental
Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1997);
Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National Perspective) for
Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225 (1997); Richard L.
Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996)
[hereinafter Interstate Externalities]; Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability:
Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. &
POL. REV. 67 (1996); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Policy and Federal Structure: A
Comparison of the United States and Germany, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1587 (1994); Richard B.
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977) [hereinafter Pyramids of Sacrifice].
18. For a general discussion of why environmental degradation may appropriately be viewed
as a symptom of one or market failures, see Esty, supra note 17, at 574-84. Professor Esty
himself, however, seems at times to suggest that this sort of market deterministic view of welfare
and value is a bit flimsy. See id. at 646 (noting that “[a] Kantian cosmopolitan perspective in
which each person defines himself politically at least in part as a citizen of the world is an
inescapable reality in the realm of environmental policy”).
19. As a sample of a typical “economic” response to the notion that environmental quality
can be viewed as a moral imperative, consider the following assertions, which plainly reveal an
enthusiasm for markets that rises to the level of religious fervor:
The most reliable guide for the moral ideals of a polity as diverse as the United States lies
in the revealed preferences of its citizens—that is, in the willingness of its citizens to pay
for environmental quality. Appeals to the moral ideals of the nation are often thinly
disguised appeals to authority when more substantive policy justifications are lacking.
Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 52.
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that description obscures more than it clarifies practices under the CAA. Two
general points illustrate this. First, the Clean Air Act’s national ambient air
quality standards do not, in fact, require all areas to achieve or maintain the
same level of air quality. The Clean Air Act specifically mandates air quality
that is better than the NAAQS in some areas and permits any state to select a
standard that is more stringent than the NAAQS if the state so chooses. Thus,
federal air quality standards are minimum, not “uniform,” standards and may
vary from area to area. Second, in practice, the CAA’s standards are not
enforced even as minimum standards. Especially with ozone, much variation
in air quality from state to state and area to area has been and continues to be
tolerated, even in areas where the costs of air quality improvements may not be
as high as they would be in other areas. Moreover, few, if any, consequences
befall areas that fail to meet minimum federal standards. To a large extent,
therefore, critics of “uniform” national air quality standards are making
“merely theoretical” arguments, ignoring the “slippage” in practice between
the written standards and practice.20
Notwithstanding this slippage, I shall argue that the written mandates of
the Clean Air Act, seeking minimum levels of air quality throughout the
nation, are warranted for a number of reasons. First, there are a variety of
uncertainties about the environmental consequences of eliminating federal air
quality standards and handing regulatory authority over to the states.
Moreover, the case that state regulation would yield greater societal benefits is
weak, resting on a number of rather implausible assumptions about state
behavior in response to devolution. Accordingly, while there are a number of
problems with federal air quality regulation—most of which are unrelated to
ambient air quality standards—the relative success of the Clean Air Act
strongly supports a cautionary approach to devolution. Second, federal
minimum air quality standards may obviate a number of barriers to effective
regulation of pollutants that states are likely to face. Finally, drawing upon
20. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 298, 300 (1999):
The essential picture of regulation in much of the environmental literature is that
Congress passes a law, federal agencies implement the program (usually through
rulemaking), and compliance follows in due course. Of course, everyone knows that this
is not the whole story, because sometimes there is slippage along the way. Still, this is the
paradigm, and much effort is devoted to attacking, defending, or reforming it. . . .
But we seriously misunderstand the regulatory system if we ignore the pervasive effect of
compliance issues on the system as a whole. The problem of obtaining compliance—and
sometimes, even knowing what “compliance” means—is pervasive. Regulatory slippage
is as central to environmental law as water resistance is to aquatic life—a ubiquitous
condition that limits efforts at movement and shapes the design and development of
everything it surrounds.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

74

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:67

Professor Richard Stewart’s conclusion that environmental quality has come to
be regarded as “national good,”21 I argue that federal minimum air quality
standards represent a responsible approach to ensuring innovative and effective
measures to protect the public health and welfare.
I.

THE MYTH OF “UNIFORM” FEDERAL AIR QUALITY STANDARDS: LAW AND
“SLIPPAGE”

Much of the discussion and criticism of federal environmental regulation
rests on a premise that is somewhat misleading, at least in the context of
federal air quality standards. That premise is that federal regulation imposes
“uniform” standards. In fact, the Clean Air Act prescribes only minimum
ambient standards and, moreover, these minimum standards are not the same
for all areas of the nation. While some critics of federal regulation briefly
mention these important aspects of the Clean Air Act, they are prone to ignore
them and move quickly to explain why federal “uniform” standards are illconceived.22 A more accurate portrait of federal air quality regulation would
recognize that, in some circumstances, federal ambient standards are not
uniform in law and certainly not uniform in practice. In this section, I briefly
describe the range of ambient standards contemplated by the Clean Air Act and
then describe with greater particularity the provisions relating to ozone
nonattainment areas and how those provisions have been implemented.
The basic structure of the Clean Air Act is built around the centerpiece of
federal national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for particular
pollutants, currently six, which are promulgated by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).23 These standards are supposed to represent the
minimum level of air quality that, “allowing an adequate margin of safety, [is]
requisite to protect the public health.”24 In considering criticisms of federal air
21. Stewart, National Good, supra note 17.
22. For example, Professor Revesz, in challenging the race-to-the-bottom rationale for
federal regulation, acknowledges that federal air quality standards are not, in fact, uniform, but
then slips into a practice of describing federal air quality standards as “uniform. See Richard L.
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1222 (1992) (“uniform federal
standards actually might reduce social welfare”) (emphasis added); see also Butler & Macey,
supra note 12, at n.55 (describing federal air quality standards and concluding that “[t]he
imposition of uniform national standards must reduce the social welfare of many communities”);
Krier, Topology, supra note 15 (directing criticism at “uniform ambient quality standards”).
23. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(a); Whitman, 121 S. Ct. at 907 (describing NAAQS). The six
pollutants for which NAAQSs have been promulgated are sulfur dioxide, particulate matter,
carbon monoxide, ozone, nitrogen dioxide, and lead. See 40 C.F.R. Part 50.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). These health-based standards are formally designated as
“primary” NAAQS. EPA is also required to promulgate “secondary” NAAQS, which “shall
specify a level of air quality the attainment and maintenance of which . . . is requisite to protect
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quality standards, it is important to distinguish between ambient standards,
such as the NAAQS, and emissions standards, such as motor vehicle tailpipe
emissions standards. Because the NAAQS are ambient standards, they do not
in themselves require pollution controls for any particular source.
Emissions controls can be distributed over a range of polluting sources and
activities with varying degrees of stringency and costs. The variety of sources
that emit ozone precursors is in some areas quite large, so choices about which
sources to regulate and how stringently to regulate them can be quite complex.
This distribution of control requirements can be an important factor—indeed,
the most important factor—in how large the aggregate costs of attaining the
NAAQS will be.
Under the 1970 Clean Air Act, the federal government’s role in selecting
emissions controls to achieve the NAAQS was important, but quite limited.
Federal emissions standards were contemplated for only two categories of
sources: motor vehicles25 and new or modified stationary sources.26 The larger
and politically sensitive task of selecting controls for existing sources and
activities was left to the states. Each state was responsible in the first instance
for developing a state implementation plan (SIP) “which provides for
implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of [the NAAQS] in each air
quality control region (or portion thereof) within such State.”27 Thus, the
states can provide selective incentives for particular sources by choosing to
regulate them more or less stringently than other sources. Moreover, given the
wide variability in air quality throughout the nation at the time Congress
enacted the 1970 Act, some areas would be faced with requirements to impose
extensive and sometimes costly control measures, while other areas would
required to impose very few, if any, controls to attain the NAAQS.
Without more, this simple description of the Clean Air Act might indeed
lead one to conclude that the legislation mandates “nationally uniform”
ambient standards, though not nationally uniform emissions controls. The
Clean Air Act does not, however, prevent states from adopting air quality
the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of
such air pollutant in the ambient air.” § 7409(b)(2). For purposes of this article, I will ignore the
secondary standards, which for ozone is the same as the primary standard. 40 C.F.R. § 50.9(a).
25. Pub. L. No. 90-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1690 (1970).
26. Id. at § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1683. The 1970 Act also included provisions for emissions
limitations on stationary sources of hazardous air pollutants, which are air pollutants that pose
serious health risks but are not regulated by ambient standards. Id. § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1685.
Reductions of hazardous air pollutants may in some cases contribute to attainment of the
NAAQS, but the regulation of these sources is not designed to facilitate compliance with the
NAAQS.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (“Each State shall . . . . adopt and submit to [EPA] . . . a plan
which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of [the NAAQS] in each air
quality control region (or portion thereof) within such State.”).
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standards more stringent than the NAAQS.28 States are thus free to set
standards or mandate pollution controls that yield a mix of environmental
quality and industrial activity different from the mix that would obtain if the
NAAQS were adhered to everywhere, so long as the standards the states select
yield air quality that is at least as good as, or better than, that required by the
NAAQS.29 An accurate description of federal standards, therefore, is that they
are national minimum standards. Necessarily, then, critics of federal ambient
air quality standards do not object to their “uniformity,” but rather to their
strictness. If the NAAQS were set at the lowest level desired by any state, and
were not preemptive of more stringent state standards, then the NAAQS
represent a federal mandate to which the states would willingly adhere. Of
course, such a standard would be useful only to the extent that federal
involvement produced some effective supplement to state regulation that, if
absent, would impair the states’ ability to maintain the NAAQS or a preferred
more stringent standard.
But even allowing for stricter standards, the simple portrait of the Clean
Air just painted masks a much richer and diverse picture. As the statute is
currently written, different areas are subject to different federal standards, both
of the ambient and emissions varieties. While the 1970 Act did treat all areas
of the country the same in terms of prescribing minimum ambient standards,
subsequent amendments do not mandate the same result.
The applicable ambient standard varies from area to area in two ways
under the statute: (1) the minimum level of air quality to be achieved or
maintained; and (2) the date on which the applicable ambient standard must be
attained. These variations are the result of Congress’s decisions, first, in 1977
to treat “dirty air areas” and “clean air areas” differently, and then in 1990 to
treat “dirty air areas” differently depending on just how “dirty” each area is.
A.

Variations in Ambient Standards for “Clean Air Areas”: The PSD
Program

When it became clear that many areas of the country would not come even
close to attaining the NAAQSs by the 1970 Act’s statutory deadline, Congress
in 1977 amended the Act to extend attainment dates and to refine SIP
requirements. For present purposes, one of the more important choices
Congress made in 1977 was to divide the country into nonattainment areas and
“clean air areas” and to impose specific SIP requirements for both types of
areas. The resulting programs introduced variation not only in the SIP
requirements, but also variation in the minimum level of air quality the areas
would be required to achieve or maintain.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
29. Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1976).
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The 1977 amendments codified an elaborate Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (“PSD”) program that prescribes the allowable level of air
quality degradation to be permitted in areas classified as “attainment,” or
“clean air,” areas—areas with air quality that is better than that required by a
NAAQS.30 The effect of the PSD program, at least for some pollutants, is to
establish ambient air quality standards that vary depending on two variables:
an area’s pre-existing air quality and choices by the states about how much
degradation in air quality is consistent with their own respective policies and
needs.
The complexities of the PSD program are notorious, but for present
purposes a simple sketch illustrates the basic point that federal law does not
impose “uniform” ambient air quality standards. The PSD program is
implemented through a permit program for new and modified “major emitting
facilities.”31 For a permit to issue, such facilities must, inter alia, employ the
“best available control technology [BACT] for each pollutant subject to
regulation under [the Clean Air Act],”32 and demonstrate that “emissions from
construction or operation of such facility will not cause, or contribute to, air
pollution in excess” of (1) specified increases in the ambient concentration of
NAAQS pollutants, known as “increments”; (2) the NAAQS; or (3) “any other
applicable emission standard or standard of performance under [the Clean Air
Act].”33 If the BACT levels of pollution control are insufficient to maintain
ambient concentrations of a pollutant within the applicable limits, the source
must either implement more stringent control measures or seek emissions
reductions from other, existing sources that contribute to ambient levels of the
pollutant in the area.34
By focusing on new and modified sources and mandating BACT, the PSD
program rather directly affects the states’ abilities to manipulate environmental
standards to achieve the states’ desired mix of environmental quality and
economic activity, for it is at the point of such significant new investment that
firms may be most apt to consider different locations. Yet, within the federal
standards governing the PSD program, the states retain some, albeit limited,
discretion. States may, as noted above, select air quality standards that are

30. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479. For detailed descriptions of the PSD program, see
generally Craig Oren, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling v. Site
Shifting, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1988); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ON PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION OF AIR QUALITY
(1981); M. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts: The
Erratic Pursuit of Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REV. 643 (1977).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475. Major emitting facilities are defined at 42 U.S.C. § 7579(1).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3).
34. See Oren, supra note 30, at 27.
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more stringent than federal minimum standards. States’ ability to relax air
quality standards is drastically more limited, but within the PSD program there
is room for some adjustments of this sort.
The extent to which air quality will be permitted to degrade in particular
areas subject to the PSD program depends on the size of the applicable
increment and on the areas’ air quality at a particular point in time—the areas’
respective “baseline dates.” The applicable increment will depend on whether
the area is classified as a Class I, Class II, or Class III area, with Class I areas
having the smallest increment and Class III areas having the largest
increment.35 For each of these classes, the statute (or EPA by regulation)
establishes the applicable increment in air quality degradation to be
permitted.36 The increment is expressed in terms of a maximum allowable
increase in concentrations of particular pollutants, subject to the requirement
that ambient concentrations may not otherwise exceed the applicable
NAAQS.37
The size of the increments do not vary within each of the three
classifications—i.e., all Class II areas are subject to the same allowable
increment. Nonetheless, the applicable ambient standard will vary from area to
area. This is because the applicable PSD ambient standard will be equal to the
sum of the fixed increment and the “baseline concentration” of the particular
pollutant in each PSD area. The baseline concentration is defined as “the
ambient concentration levels [of a particular pollutant] which exist at the time
of the first application for a permit in an area subject to [the PSD program],
based on air quality data available in [EPA] or a State air pollution control
agency and on such monitoring data as the permit applicant is required to
submit.”38 This baseline concentration will, of course, vary from area to area.
As a result, the applicable ambient standard for one PSD area may also be
different from the ambient standard for another PSD area, even if those areas
are placed in the same Class, due to variability in the ambient concentration of
particular pollutants on the areas’ respective “baseline date.”39 For example,

35. See 42 U.S.C. § 7473.
36. The statute sets maximum allowable increases for sulfur dioxide and particulates. See 42
U.S.C. § 7473. For other pollutants, EPA is required to promulgate regulations which “provide
specific measures at least as effective as the increments established” for sulfur dioxide and
particulates. 42 U.S.C. § 7476(d).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 7473(b)(4).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(4); see also Alabama Power v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 374-76 (D.C.Cir
1980) (discussing “baseline date”).
39. See Oren, supra note 30, at 23. Professor Oren describes the PSD standards as “tertiary”
standards, distinguishing them from the primary and secondary NAAQS.
[T]he sum of the increments and the pre-existing baseline concentration amounts to a
kind of “tertiary” standard controlling the maximum level of pollution in any clean air
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the ambient sulfur dioxide standard (expressed as the annual arithmetic mean
concentration of sulfur dioxide in micrograms per cubic meter of air) for an
area designated as a Class II area, and a corresponding allowable increment of
20 micrograms per cubic meter of air,40 with a baseline concentration of 50
would be 70, whereas the ambient standard for an area with a baseline
concentration of 40 would be 60. Once the baseline concentration has been
established and the appropriate increment selected, states must prevent air
quality from deteriorating beyond the prescribed level.41
The amount of growth in emissions that a particular area may permit—the
size of the applicable increment—depends on whether the area is designated as
a Class I, Class II, or Class III area. Areas of special federal concern—e.g.,
large national parks and national wilderness areas—are placed in the most
protected classifications, Class I or Class II, and may not be redesignated to a
less-protected class.42 The restrictive standards for these areas are not properly
subject to the same criticism usually leveled against the NAAQSs, for in such
areas federal interests properly dominate state or local interests.
All other areas are designated as Class II areas.43 Importantly, most areas
designated as Class II areas by the statute may be redesignated by states or
tribal authorities as either Class I or Class III areas.44 The PSD program thus
permits areas to make some decisions about the desired mix of economic
activity and environmental quality.45 A state seeking to encourage new or
modified major sources to locate in the state could be expected to redesignate
Class II areas as Class III areas to accommodate the maximum concentration
of pollutants permissible under the CAA, and thus, lower the costs to new and
modified sources.46 Surprisingly, however, no state has yet chosen to
area. Unlike the [NAAQS], though, the tertiary standard is not uniform; rather, it varies
according to the baseline concentration in each area and the classification of the area.
Id. at 28.
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 7473(b)(2).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 7471; see Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 361-64 (discussing obligations of
states to protect increments).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7472(a), 7474(a)(1)-(2). Protected national areas originally designated as
Class II areas may be redesignated as Class I areas. See id. § 7474(a).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 7472(b).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7474(a).
45. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1183 1196 (“The PSD program explicitly permits economic development that will degrade
air quality to some extent, and there are provisions (admittedly they are procedurally
burdensome) that permit each state to adopt either a relatively pro-development or more
environmentally protective PSD program.”).
46. See Final Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 12853 (Mar. 18, 1994) (“Class III increments allow for
higher levels of industrial growth.”).
There are certain fixed costs imposed on new or modified major sources, regardless of
where these sources choose to locate. All such sources must comply with the BACT requirement,

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

80

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:67

redesignate any Class II area as a Class III area.47 Put in slightly different way,
no state has yet found it necessary or appropriate to sacrifice air quality to
achieve desired economic goals, at least for those pollutants to which the Class
designations are applicable and for those areas that currently enjoy air quality
better than the level of the NAAQS.
The absence of effort on the part of states to redesignate Class II areas to
Class III areas suggests that, for at least some pollutants, federal minimum
standards do not impose serious constraints on industrial activities in large
portions of the nation. In fact, all areas of the nation are considered PSD areas
for one or more pollutants for which a NAAQS has been established.48
Accordingly, the PSD program is applicable nationwide.
Nonetheless, it would be improper to conclude that experience under the
PSD program permits a conclusion that federal standards do not hamper states’
choices about the appropriate mix of air quality and industrial activity. First,
the PSD program is a pollutant specific regime. Thus, an area can be a PSD
area for one or more pollutants, while also being designated as a nonattainment
area for one or more pollutants. While all areas are subject to the PSD
program, new or modified major sources of pollutants for which an area is in
nonattainment are subject to a different regulatory program that, inter alia,
effectively precludes such sources from contributing to further air quality
degradation.49 Thus, the NAAQS place rather strict limits on the ability of

for example. BACT standards are set by reference to federal criteria, but they are not nationally
uniform; BACT is determined on a permit-by-permit basis. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (defining
best available control technology as a that which is determined on” on a case-by-case basis” to
meet statutory criteria). Thus, states have some discretion to manipulate the BACT requirement
to reduce costs to industry, although EPA has issued guidance designed to control the exercise of
that discretion. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New
Source Review (NSR), Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 61 Fed. Reg. 38250, 38,272-73 (July 23,
1996) (describing EPA BACT determination methodology) [hereinafter NSR Proposed
Rulemaking]. Cost savings for new or modified major sources can be expected from a larger
increment in situations in which either the increment has already been consumed or states seek to
allocate the remaining available increment among present and future sources. In these
circumstances, a new or modified source may be required to seek offsetting reductions from
existing sources in the area to ensure that the new or modified source’s emissions do not cause
the available increment to be exceeded. For discussion, see Oren, supra note 30, at 30-40.
47. Id. at 25-26 (noting that “[t]here is . . . no area carrying the Class III designation”).
48. For example, all areas of the country currently meet the NAAQS for nitrogen dioxide.
See TRENDS REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
49. New or modified “major stationary sources” in nonattainment areas are subject to a
permitting program established pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7503. Among other things, to gain a
permit, major sources must offset their pollutant emissions by obtaining emissions reductions of
that pollutant from existing sources. Id. § 7503(c). For some pollutants, including ozone, the
ratio of new emissions to offsetting emissions reductions from existing sources that a new major
source must secure increases with the severity of nonattainment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a(a)(4),

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT

81

nonattainment areas to select a mix of economic activity and environmental
quality.
Second, increments within the PSD program have not been established for
ozone, which is the most widespread air quality problem in the nation. As
presently structured, the PSD program includes increments for only three
pollutants: sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and nitrogen dioxide.50 Without
established allowable increments for ozone, the only ambient standard that
must be satisfied under the PSD program for ozone is the NAAQS.
Despite these limitations, for many areas of the nation, perhaps most, it
seems plausible to conclude that the NAAQS have not required states to
sacrifice economic growth to achieve compliance with air quality standards. If
this is right, it significantly blunts the force of the standard efficiency-related
criticism of federal air quality standards.
B.

Variations in the Ozone NAAQS for Nonattainment Areas

There are, of course, many areas that currently do not meet the ozone
NAAQS. If the ozone NAAQS is impairing economic growth in derogation of
local preferences, as critics charge, it would be within these areas that we could
expect to find the proof. On the other hand, because the areas are not currently
satisfying the federal ozone standard, we cannot be sure of the costs associated
with achieving air quality consistent with the NAAQS. Given the complexities
associated with either of these inquiries—which I concede to be beyond my
capacity—a surrogate inquiry may be useful in assessing the extent to which
the ozone NAAQS exacts welfare losses in particular areas. We might ask, in
relation to nonattainment areas, what costs states face by virtue of their
nonattainment status. For purposes of this analysis, “costs” are limited to the
sanctions or penalties federal law exacts for noncompliance. If these
noncompliance costs for any particular area are significant, but noncompliance
continues, we could plausibly conclude that the NAAQS standards impose
costs in excess of benefits in that area, otherwise a state interested in
maximizing welfare would choose to comply rather than face the costs of
noncompliance. By contrast, if states face no costs, or only minimal costs, for
noncompliance, a “rational,” welfare- maximizing state will simply ignore the
NAAQS and opt for air quality that the area believes achieves the appropriate
mix of economic activity and environmental quality. In these circumstances,
we could plausibly conclude that the NAAQS do not exact welfare losses for
particular areas.

7511a(b)(5), 7511a(c)(10), 7511a(d)(2), 7511a(e)(1)-(2). For a general overview of the
requirements applicable to new or modified major stationary sources, see NSR Proposed
Rulemaking, supra note 46, at 38,253-55.
50. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(c); Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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Before considering these issues, it is necessary, first, to get a working idea
of what “compliance” with the NAAQS means under the provisions of the
Clean Air Act.
1. The Meaning of “Compliance” and “Nonattainment”
As mentioned above, in 1977, Congress began to classify areas into PSD
areas and nonattainment areas. This decision was largely in recognition of the
widespread failure to attain and the political and economic unacceptability of
continuing to treat nonattaining areas as being “in violation of the law” with
the threat of sanctions. The importance of the 1977 amendments formalizing a
class of areas as “nonattainment areas,” and subjecting this class to
requirements different from those applicable to clean air areas, lies in the
recognition that an area may be in “nonattainment” with the NAAQS, but still
be in “compliance” with the Clean Air Act. Few critics of “uniform” federal
environmental standards have regarded the distinction between compliance
with the statute and attainment of the NAAQS as significant. Clearly,
however, if areas are deemed to be in compliance with the statute by achieving
a level of air quality that is somewhat less clean than the NAAQS and may
delay attainment of the NAAQS for a period of several years without incurring
sanctions, the welfare effects of the statute are likely to be considerably
different than the welfare effects of a statute that required immediate
attainment.
Under the 1977 amendments, little variation in regulatory treatment among
nonattainment areas appears to have been contemplated. All such areas were
required to attain the ozone NAAQS as “expeditiously as practicable, but . . . .
not later than December 31, 1982,” unless attainment by that date was not
possible, “despite the implementation of all reasonably available measures.”
In such a case, attainment could be postponed until December 31, 1987.51 All
such areas were required to revise their SIPs to include various requirements,
such as provisions for implementing “all reasonably available control measures
as expeditiously as practicable,” “reasonably available control technology” for
existing sources, and a permit program for major new or modified stationary
Yet, given the generality of most of these requirements,
sources.52
nonattainment areas with vastly different SIPs were deemed to be in
compliance with the statute.
In the 1990 amendments, Congress departed from past legislative practice
and concluded that it would be inappropriate to treat all ozone nonattainment
areas the same or to set general SIP requirements that vested large amounts of
discretion in the states and EPA. Different treatment of different areas was
51. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(b), 91 Stat. 746 (1977).
52. Id., 91 Stat. 747.
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deemed appropriate in apparent recognition of the difference in the rates that
areas could reasonably be expected to attain the NAAQS. As a result, the 1990
Act places ozone nonattainment areas into one of six categories, depending on
the seriousness of the areas’ ozone problems.53 The classification system
effectively prescribes different ambient standards for each classification. It
does so by varying the deadlines by which areas in the respective
classifications are required to attain the ozone NAAQS. Areas with ozone
concentrations just above the NAAQS were required to attain the ozone
NAAQS by 1993, while areas with the most severe ozone problems were given
until 2010 to achieve the NAAQS.54
This extended period for attainment can be explained as a way to
incorporate costs and feasibility considerations into the design of the ambient
standards, where otherwise such considerations are prohibited.55 Extended
attainment dates can be expected to reduce the total costs of attaining the
NAAQS in a number of ways—e.g., permitting older polluting equipment to
be used for more of its economic life before it must be replaced with cleaner
technologies; providing a longer opportunity for the innovation and
development of low-polluting technologies, such as alternative-fuel vehicles,
and making these technologies available at lower cost; and enabling firms to
phase-in less polluting technologies over longer periods of time, reducing the
overall costs of doing so.
The 1990 amendments did, however, purport to limit the discretion of
states in terms of the timing of certain controls and in ways that Congress
deemed reasonable. To be in “compliance” with the 1990 amendments, as
with the 1977 amendments, states with nonattainment areas had to enact and
implement various SIP revisions in accordance with fixed statutory schedules,
and demonstrate attainment by the applicable attainment date. To be sure,
these requirements are complex, but on their face, the statutory requirements
seem by degrees considerably more precise than those of the 1977
amendments. In theory, then, it should be a relatively straightforward matter to
determine whether any particular nonattainment area was in compliance with
the statute, regardless whether it had attained the NAAQS. In practice,
however, determining whether a state with an ozone nonattainment area is in
compliance (officially and non-officially) with the statute has proven to be a
considerably more complex issue.
2. Slippage: Variance Between Practice and Statute

53. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a). The are classifications are marginal, moderate, serious, severe,
severe-17, and extreme.
54. Id.
55. See Whitman, 121 S. Ct. at 903.
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The foregoing discussion indicates that the Clean Air Act makes provision
for varying ambient air quality standards, and thus, criticisms premised on the
notion that federal law requires uniform standards to be met is somewhat
misleading. Efforts to accommodate the varying costs of achieving the
NAAQS are accounted for both in the PSD program, which actually imposes
variable standards, and the special provisions for ozone nonattainment areas in
the 1990 Act, which do not vary the standard to be achieved, but provide for
longer time frames and differential SIP revisions for compliance in areas where
an immediate or short-term requirement to attain the NAAQS might be
considered unrealistic or excessively costly.
The variability in ambient standards permitted by the Clean Air Act is,
however, relatively modest, and for nonattainment areas the variation
permitted is unlikely to satisfy critics’ concerns about the inefficiencies they
claim are the inevitable consequence of uniform national standards. Yet,
within the constraints of the ozone NAAQS, much greater variation in actual
air quality, and control requirements, is permitted in practice than one might
expect from an analysis of the statute alone.
A more pragmatic assessment of the NAAQS would consider the fuller
institutional framework within which the permissible—or at least tolerated—
concentration of ozone for any particular area is determined. As a rough guide
for such an assessment, the following variables would seem pertinent: (1) the
ozone NAAQS; (2) state decisions concerning whether to adopt a standard
more stringent than the NAAQS; (3) the area’s attainment date; (4) the
applicable requirements governing SIPs; (5) the manner in which EPA (and the
courts) interpret regulatory requirements; (6) the rigor with which statutory
requirements for ozone nonattainment areas are enforced by EPA and the
courts; and (7) the extent to which SIP control measures selected by a state and
approved by EPA actually yield the expected (or claimed) reductions in
ambient ozone levels. The last three factors are rarely considered by critics of
federal standards, but the relevance of these factors to their efficiency claims
seems obvious and critical. As Professor Farber argues:
[C]ompliance with standards is frequently delayed, incomplete, or even
nonexistent. Thus, standards may commonly function as starting points in the
lengthy interactions between agencies and regulated parties, rather than as end
points of compliance. . . . The optimum “standards” for these purposes may
well be quite different from (and often harsher than) the ultimate performance
level that we wish to attain.
To the extent this situation holds true—to the extent, that is, that slippage
is widespread—it is far from clear that the standards themselves should reflect
an optimum balance of compliance costs and environmental benefits. The fact
that the standards are sometimes too harsh—that they have compliance costs
that are too high compared with benefits—may be perfectly reasonable. In
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effect, the standards may merely be the government’s opening demand in
negotiations, and the final bargain is likely to be more favorable to the other
side. . . . . Thus, the criticism that regulatory standards are too harsh loses
some of its force, once it is recognized that the standards are often only
partially implemented.
Similarly, attacks on the “one size fits all” nature of regulation also lose
some of their force once slippage is taken into account.56

In considering the potential for “slippage” it is useful to start with the basic
division of responsibilities between EPA and the states under the Clean Air.
This structural arrangement, which vests responsibility to implement sourcespecific control measures almost entirely in the states, virtually invites
variation between the statute as written and the statute as implemented in
circumstances where the state’s interests diverge from strict compliance with
the statute. Professor Dwyer, for example, has concluded that “[a]lthough it
has as much legal authority as it needs, the federal government cannot
implement its air pollution program without the substantial resources,
expertise, information, and political support of state and local officials.”57
Similarly, Professor McGarity, has observed that the Clean Air Act’s “system
of dual responsibility . . . has given state and local institutions a great deal of
flexibility to make concessions to local economic and political constraints in
addressing local pollution problems.”58
Often “concessions” to state and local preferences take the form of rather
direct deviations from statutory requirements, but such deviations are often
clouded by technical issues, making them difficult to identify. Moreover, the
available methods to hold institutions and practices accountable once deviance
from statutory requirements is apparent are cumbersome and, to a considerable
extent, have not been ineffective.59 As a consequence, the Clean Air Act in
56. Farber, supra note 20, at 315-16; see Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of
Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 57 (2001) (noting that under-enforcement
may “represent ‘bottom up’ efforts to improve the rationality of the command statutory system in
light of practical experience with its implementation,” that the aim of slippage, “like that of
formal cost-benefit analysis and risk analysis, is to avoid imposing regulatory costs that are
disproportionate to benefits and to conserve administrative resources for higher priority
environmental protection tasks,” and that slippage “can accordingly be regarded, in many cases,
as pragmatic applications of cost-benefit analysis and risk regulatory prioritization”) (footnotes
omitted).
57. Dwyer, supra note 45, at 1224.
58. Thomas O. McGarity, Missing Milestones: A Critical Look at the Clean Air Act’s VOC
Emissions Reduction Program in Nonattainment Areas, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 41, 42 (1999).
59. The chief method of enforcing statutory requirements when EPA and the states are
unwilling to adhere to the statute is citizens suits. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604. For a suggestion that
citizen suits may not be an effective way to accomplish this objective, at least in some
circumstances, see McGarity, supra note 58, at 97-98.
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practice is quite a different regulatory program than one would gather from a
review of the statute alone.
A.

Experience Under the 1977 Amendments

The problems dogging effective implementation of the NAAQS are
complex. In the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress first directly
addressed the problem of nonattainment and developed specific programs
designed to induce the states to make “reasonable further progress” toward
attainment. The chief mechanisms for this purpose were provisions permitting
EPA to extend the attainment date for such areas by as much as ten years and
mandates for revisions to state implementation plans, including requirements
to adopt and implement certain control measures.60 To provide incentives for
states to make the appropriate SIP revisions, EPA was authorized to cut off
federal funds for highway construction in the event states failed to submit the
SIPs. Additionally, in areas that failed to meet their new attainment dates, new
major sources and modifications to existing major sources were banned.
Finally, as with the 1970 Act, EPA was authorized to implement a control
program of its own design (a federal implementation plan, or “FIP”) in states
where SIPs were not forthcoming or were inadequate.
Nonetheless, the program requirements for nonattainment areas proved
extraordinarily difficult to implement. Many states did not submit adequate
SIPs and many failed to attain the ozone NAAQS by 1987.61 EPA was
reluctant to impose sanctions on these areas, and when it proposed to do so,
Congress twice came to the rescue and extended the areas’ attainment dates
and/or prohibited EPA from going forward with sanctions.62 The clear
message to the states was that the federal government was not really serious
about forcing the states to implement programs that they otherwise would not
willingly accept.63
The states’ failure to develop adequate SIPs in response to the 1977
amendments and the continuing problems of nonattainment have been
addressed in a few studies.64 Some of the factors identified as contributing to

60. See Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129, 91 Stat. 685, 746-51 (1977).
61. See Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean
Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1689 (1991) (“Many states produced ‘cheater SIPs’ they never
expected to implement.”).
62. Office of Technology Assessment, Urban Ozone and the Clean Air Act: Problems and
Proposals for Change 119-20 (1988) [hereinafter cited as OTA Report].
63. Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987). For a discussion of the implementation of
the 1977 amendments, see McGarity, supra note 58, at 46-50.
64. See, e.g., id. at 46-50; Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and
the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1688-95 (1991); Craig N. Oren, The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 A Bridge to the Future?, 21 ENVTL. L. 1817, 1834-35 (1991); OTA Report,
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these problems include: incomplete and inaccurate information about pollutant
emissions levels leading to underestimates of the reductions in emissions
needed to attain the NAAQS; “gaming” behavior by state regulators who
manipulated atmospheric models in developing SIPs to show attainment within
the applicable time frame with the least stringent controls; inadequate funding
and expertise among state agencies; failures by states to implement or enforce
SIP requirements; EPA delays in issuing critical rules and guidance
documents; political resistance to necessary controls by state legislators;
interstate transport of pollutants; and unreasonable deadlines.65 As Professor
Latin reports, EPA itself admitted that the agency was” reluctant to formally
reject [state submissions], but rather [tried] to work with their colleagues in the
processing chain by phone calls and protracted negotiation.”66
In addition to these problems, one clear conclusion emerges:
Notwithstanding the NAAQS and provisions for sanctions on recalcitrant
states, the 1977 amendments simply were not implemented in a way that would
force states to severely limit or reduce what the states perceived to be a
desirable level of economic activity for the sake of air quality improvements.67
In a study by the General Accounting Office, investigators concluded that state
and local officials displayed “a general reluctance to implement control
measures that will have a negative impact on economic development or change
life-styles.”68 Importantly, as suggested above, this reluctance was not
countered by aggressive federal oversight:
[S]tate officials, who had never been inclined to press local industries and
commuters, detected a subtle and sometimes explicit message that few
consequences would attend the failure to meet their SIP obligations, despite the
clear language of the statute. They also correctly perceived that the probability
the EPA would write its own FIP for the states was vanishingly small. States
simply had no incentive to implement effective emissions control programs

supra note 62, at 122-28; U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Pollution: Ozone Nonattainment
Requires Long-Term Solutions to Solve Complex Problems, Report No. GAO/RCED-88-40 (1988)
[hereinafter cited as GAO Report]; William Pedersen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129
U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (1981).
65. See OTA Report, supra note 62, at 122-28.
66. Latin, supra note 61, at 1691 (quoting EPA, State Implementation Plan Processing
Reform, 54 Fed. Reg. 2214, 2217 (1989)).
67. See id. at 1657-58 (describing EPA’s unwillingness to require SIPs that would impose
economic hardship). Latin proposes as one “law of administrative behavior” the maxim that
“agencies avoid making regulatory decisions that would create severe social or economic
dislocation.” Id. at 1656.
68. GAO Report, supra note 64 at 27 (quoted in OTA Report, supra note 62, at 128).
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over the determined opposition of local companies and local automobile
drivers.69

Lacking incentives to comply with the apparent rigidity of the CAA,
“regulation in practice [was] more like an extended and generally acrimonious
negotiation involving EPA, the states, various industries, and Congress, with
the courts often serving as the referee.”70
B.

Experience Under the 1990 Amendments

In light of this experience under the 1977 amendments, an important
question is whether the 1990 amendments have altered the respective
bargaining positions of state and federal authorities in ways that yield greater
state investment in attaining the ozone NAAQS than would otherwise be
warranted in light of local preferences. The primary way in which the federal
hand could be strengthened is to raise the costs for states that fail to meet
federal standards through sanctions or other mechanisms. In the theoretical
literature, the assumption appears to be that the costs to states of
noncompliance with the NAAQS are currently very high, virtually precluding
the states from deliberately choosing to settle for ambient air quality of lesser
quality than that demanded by federal law. Were it otherwise, the argument
that the CAA places too much control in the federal government and mandates
unwanted levels of environmental quality (and its attendant costs) on otherwise
unwilling citizens, loses much of its practical force. That is, if states can,
without incurring significant costs, successfully negotiate with federal
authorities a strategy of attaining air quality that is somewhat less protective of
public health than the ozone NAAQS, the argument for devolution of formal
authority to the states would have to be based on something other than the
claim that federal law fails to account for variation in conditions among the
different regions of the nation.
Experience to date under the 1990 amendments suggests that, as in the
past, states are not likely to face very high costs for failing to meet federal
mandates. Accordingly, a realistic appraisal of the CAA’s functioning does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that its formal insistence on attainment
of nationally uniform standards is utterly insensitive to variations in local
preferences.
In the 1990 Amendments, Congress did attempt to address some of the
problems under the 1977 amendments by imposing what Congress perceived

69. McGarity, supra note 58, at 49. McGarity also surveys additional reasons why the 1977
amendments failed to achieve widespread attainment of the ozone NAAQS. Id. at 48-50.
70. George Eads, The Confusion of Goals and Instruments: The Explicit Consideration of
Cost in Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, in FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 259, 262 (Richard L. Revesz ed., 1997).
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to be more realistic attainment dates and control programs. The obligations of
states containing ozone nonattainment areas were spelled out in extraordinary
detail in the statute. While attainment dates were extended, Congress “added
short-term deadlines for many intermediate steps, including SIP
submissions.”71 These intermediate steps include innovative mechanisms
designed to provide incentives against noncompliance and to ensure that
control measures yield the ozone reduction benefits they are supposed to.
First, Congress demanded that states “submit a comprehensive, accurate,
current inventory of actual emissions from all sources,” and to update such
inventories every three years until the ozone NAAQS is attained.72 The hope
was that such inventories would correct the problem of unrealistic assessments
of extant emissions and the amount of reductions needed to attain the
NAAQS—a problem that was widely perceived as one of the more significant
failings under prior law.73
Second, for all but “marginal” nonattainment areas, Congress
supplemented the 1997 amendments’ vague requirement that states revise their
SIPs to demonstrate “reasonable further progress” toward attainment of the
ozone NAAQS with specific emission reduction targets. All areas save for
marginal areas were required to implement rate of progress plans that included
sufficient control measures to reduce emissions of volatile organic compounds
(VOCs)—a primary ozone precursor—from 1990 baseline levels by 15% by
no later than 1996.74 Serious, severe, and extreme nonattainment areas were
additionally required to reduce VOC emissions by 3% annually after 1996 until
the NAAQS was attained.75 The Amendments also include a variety of
additional control measures that states must adopt, including for example,
vehicle inspection and maintenance programs, gasoline vapor recovery
systems, and improved measures for assuring that major stationary sources
were employing reasonably available control technologies.76 The control
measures become incrementally more stringent as the applicable classification

71. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Browner, 57 F.3d 1122, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a(a)(1), (3).
73. See OTA Report, supra note 62, at 123-25.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(b)(1)(A). Under certain circumstances, reductions of less than 15
percent are permitted. See id. § 7511a(b)(1)(A)(ii). A similar percentage reduction is required
for emissions of nitrogen oxides. See id. § 7511a(f).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(1)(B). Annual reductions of less than three percent are authorized
is the state “demonstrates to the satisfaction of [EPA] that the plan reflecting such lesser amount
includes all measures that can feasibly be implemented in the area, in light of technological
achievability.” Id. § 7511a(c)(1)(B)(ii).
76. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a(b)(2) (reasonably available control technologies), §7511(b)(3)
(gas vapor recovery), §7511(b)(4) (vehicle inspection and maintenance).
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increases.77 The 1990 amendments mandated “automatic” sanctions in the
event states failed to submit SIPs or to rectify SIPs that EPA had
disapproved.78
To assure that the plans for emissions reductions actually have the desired
effect, and hold the states accountable for any shortfalls, Congress introduced a
“milestones” program. Areas (except marginal and moderate areas) that are
subject to emissions reduction targets are required to determine at three-year
intervals whether the reductions have, in fact, occurred, and to submit to EPA a
demonstration to that effect.79 The milestones programs is premised on the
axiom that “what gets counted, gets done,” and attempts to put in place a set of
clear obligations and provisions to ensure accountability.80 If a state fails to
submit a compliance demonstration or if emissions reductions fail to meet the
target, the affected State must elect to have the area reclassified to the next
higher classification (which subjects the area to additional control
requirements), implement control measures selected by EPA and determined
by EPA to be adequate to achieve the next milestone, or adopt an economic
incentive program.81 If the state fails to make such an election, the area is
reclassified, or “bumped up,” “by operation of law.”82 “The hope was that the
milestone process would enable EPA and the states to isolate areas that were
not progressing swiftly enough toward the statutory goals and to remedy the
implementation problems in those areas.”83
Congress also made provision for areas that failed to attain the ozone
NAAQS by the applicable deadline. Rather than investing EPA with
discretionary authority to establish for these areas a new attainment date and
“reasonable further progress” requirements for SIPs,84 Congress included
automatic mechanisms. The Act directs EPA to determine within six months
following an area’s attainment date whether the area attained the NAAQS.85
Except for areas classified as “severe” or “extreme,” a determination of
77. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(a) (marginal area requirements), with id. §7511a(c) (serious
area requirements).
78. See Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d 517, 520-21 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing
sanctions); NRDC, 57 F.3d at 1123-24 (same).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(g).
80. See McGarity, supra note 58, at 43, 53-54, 99. For a discussion and endorsement of a
system of regulation incorporating “milestones,” see National Academy of Public Administration,
The Environmental Protection System in Transition Toward a More Desirable Future, Final
Report of the Enterprise for the Environment, 12-18 (1996).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(g)(3).
82. Id.
83. McGarity, supra note 58, at 43.
84. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7509(d) (general provision detailing consequences of failure to
attain).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(2)(A).
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nonattainment has the consequence that the nonattaining area is reclassified, or
“bumped up” to a higher classification “by operation of law.”86
Reclassification has the effect of establishing a new attainment date (i.e., the
attainment applicable to the higher classification) and imposing specific,
additional SIP revision obligations on the affected state (i.e., the control
requirements applicable to the higher classification).87 For severe and extreme
areas, the statute specifies in detail the sanctions and additional SIP obligations
that apply in the event of failure to attain by the statutory deadline.88
Experience to date suggests that the innovative mechanisms of the 1990
amendments have either not been implemented or have not been effective in
ensuring that the states make genuine progress toward attainment. Important
components of the milestones program have essentially been abandoned by
EPA.89 Writing in 1999, Professor McGarity noted:
[T]he milestone program failed because the states were once again not held
accountable for empty promises and overly optimistic projections in their rateof-progress SIPs. . . .
Congress went to great lengths to provide an
accountability vehicle in the 1990 amendments by requiring states to
demonstrate after-the-fact that the milestones had been achieved and by
meticulously specifying the consequences of state failure to make adequate
rate-of-progress demonstrations. The EPA, no doubt in tacit collusion with the
states, completely undermined this arrangement by failing to promulgate
regulations specifying how states should go about making such demonstrations
and by adopting the position that no such demonstrations were required until
the EPA promulgated such regulations.90

Widespread failure on the part of states to submit SIPs within the time
frames mandated by the 1990 amendments, like the failure to comply with the
milestones program, has not been met with the “automatic” consequences
Congress intended to put in place. Under the 1990 amendments, there are
several events that serve to trigger the possibility of sanctions.91 These triggers
start a “sanctions clock,” which gives the offending state eighteen months to
correct the deficiency or face “mandatory” sanctions.92 A restrictive
interpretation of how the sanctions clock operates has taken much of the sting
86. Id.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(i); see also State Implementation Plans; General Preamble for the
Implementation of Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 57 Fed. Reg. 13498, 13506
(April 18, 1992).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(4).
89. McGarity, supra note 58, at 84-89.
90. Id. at 97.
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 179 (a). The statutory triggers are: (1) an EPA finding that a state has
failed to submit a required SIP; (2) an EPA disapproval of a submitted SIP; (3) an EPA finding
that an approved SIP is not being implemented. Id.
92. See Natural Resources Defense Council, 57 F.3d at 1123-24.
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of sanctions out of the implementation of the 1990 amendments.93 But EPA
has been extraordinarily reluctant to take the actions that would even trigger
the possibility of sanctions.
A “real-life” example illustrates this reluctance. Under the 1990
amendments, “moderate” ozone nonattainment areas were required to submit a
rate of progress plan providing for specified reductions of VOC emissions.94
The deadline for making this submission was November 15, 1993.95 The state
of Missouri submitted its first rate of progress plan for the St. Louis ozone
nonattainment area in November 1993, but in January 1994, EPA found that
the SIP was incomplete, triggering the sanctions clock.96 Missouri submitted
another rate of progress SIP in January 1995, supplemented by submissions in
March and July of 1995; EPA managed to find the submission “complete,”
stopping the sanctions clock, just one day prior to the date on which the
mandatory sanctions were to be put in place.97 In March 1996, EPA proposed
a “limited approval and limited disapproval” of the state’s rate of progress
plan. The primary reason for disapproving the plan was that the state’s plan
relied heavily on an enhanced vehicle inspection and maintenance program to
achieve the required emissions reductions, but in 1995, the Missouri legislature
had deleted funding for the program from the state’s budget.98
The proposed “limited disapproval” of the state’s rate of progress plan was
never finalized by EPA, and thus, the sanctions clock was never restarted, even
though it was clear that the plan could never be approved until, at the very
least, the legislature acted to restore funding for the inspection/maintenance
93. See id. at 1125. EPA interpreted the Act to permit a state that has failed to submit a
required SIP or failed to submit a complete SIP to halt the sanctions clock by submitting a
“complete” SIP, even if the complete SIP is clearly inadequate to meet statutory requirements and
will be disapproved by EPA. Thus, a state seeking the maximum period of time to comply with a
requirement to submit a particular type of SIP revision could first fail to submit anything by the
statutory deadline. If EPA were vigilant, six months later the agency would make a finding that
the state failed to submit the required SIP revision, which would trigger the sanctions clock.
Eighteen months later, the state could halt the sanctions clock by submitting a “complete,” but
substantively deficient SIP. A vigilant EPA would then have twelve months to approve or
disapprove the SIP. If EPA disapproves the SIP, a new sanctions clock begins to run and the state
has another eighteen months to correct the deficiency. Thus, assuming EPA observes all the
deadlines governing action on SIPs that the statute places on the agency—an assumption that runs
counters to empirical reality—a state could effectively stall its obligation to submit an approvable
SIP for a period of four and one-half years. The D.C. Circuit sustained EPA’s interpretation of
the statute. See id. at 1125-29.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(b)(1)(A).
95. Id.
96. See EPA, Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State of Missouri, 61
Fed. Reg. 10968, 10970 (Mar. 18, 1996).
97. Id.
98. See id.
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program. The emissions reductions associated with the rate of progress plan
were by statute required to be achieved by no later than November 1996.99 As
a moderate ozone nonattainment area, the St. Louis area’s statutory attainment
deadline was November 15, 1996.100 But it was not until November 1999 that
the state of Missouri submitted a revised rate of progress plan,101 which was
approved by EPA in May 2000.102
The experience of the St. Louis area with the (virtually non-existent)
possibility of sanctions is apparently not an isolated experience. A 1997
Congressional Research Service report identified only one area of the country
that was then subject to EPA-imposed sanctions—a small area in East Helena,
Montana.103
EPA has similarly resisted the “automatic” consequences associated with
areas’ failure to attain the ozone NAAQS by the applicable attainment date.
Of the 90 ozone nonattainment areas originally classified as either a marginal,
moderate, or serious, forty-five have been re-designated to attainment and are
considered ozone maintenance areas.104 Of the remaining forty-five ozone
nonattainment areas whose attainment deadlines have now passed—the
attainment date for highest category considered here, “serious areas,” was
November 15, 1999105—only four have been reclassified, or “bumped up.”106
99. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(b)(1)(A).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) (table of attainment dates).
101. See 65 Fed. Reg. 8083, 8084 (Feb. 17, 2000).
102. Id. The revised plan itself does not mandate a 15 percent reduction of VOCs from 1990
baseline levels, because it fails to account for any growth in emissions in the nonattainment area
between 1996 and the date on which all the control measures in the plan will be implemented.
EPA’s approval of the plan was challenged on this basis, but the Eighth Circuit concluded that
EPA’s conclusion that the statute merely required an accounting for growth up to 1996 was
entitled to Chevron deference. Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 00-2744, slip op. at 8 (8th Cir., June 6,
2001).
103. See Congressional Research Service, Highway Fund Sanctions for Clean Air Act
Violations, Report No. 97-959 ENR, available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/trans-9html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2001).
104. The numbers presented in the text were generated by analyzing information reported in
EPA’s “Green Book.” See, e.g., at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/oinex.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2001).
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 181(a) (Table of attainment deadlines).
106. See 63 Fed. Reg. 8128 (Feb.18, 1998) (Dallas-Fort Worth reclassified from moderate to
serious); 62 Fed. Reg. 65025 (Dec. 10, 1997) (Santa Barbara reclassified from moderate to
serious); 62 Fed. Reg. 60001 (Nov. 6, 1997) (Phoenix reclassified from moderate to serious); 59
Fed. Reg. 50848 (Oct. 06, 1994) (Poughkeepsie reclassified from marginal to moderate). See
also EPA, Green Book, Federal Register Notices Related to Ozone Designations and
Classifications, at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/ofrnrptl.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2001). EPA has also proposed rules that reclassify the Louisville and Beaumont-Port Arthur
ozone nonattainment areas, both of which were originally classified as moderate areas. See 64
Fed. Reg. 27734 (May 21, 1999) (Louisville); 64 Fed. Reg. 18864 (Apr. 16, 1999) (Beaumont-
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For the remaining areas, it appears that the statutory requirement that EPA
determine whether attainment was reached within six months of the applicable
attainment date, with reclassification “by operation of law” for those areas that
failed to attain,107 has simply been forgotten, ignored, or otherwise avoided.
Within this large group of areas that EPA has not reclassified or redesignated as attainment areas, several may be affected by an EPA policy that
grants extensions of statutory attainment dates if an area can show that its
ability to attain the ozone NAAQS was impaired by ozone transport—the
movement of ozone or ozone precursors from sources in an “upwind area” into
another “downwind area”). For a few areas that may qualify for this sort of
non-statutory extension, EPA has prevented areas from being “reclassified by
operation of law” by deferring action relating to determinations of whether the
areas attained the NAAQS by their previously applicable attainment dates.108
Aside from their questionable legality,109 EPA’s practices of apparently
just ignoring the requirement to determine whether areas attained and of
liberally granting extensions on the basis of ozone transport, has undermined
Congress’s efforts to introduce accountability and to create incentives for state
compliance. In its initial iterations, the ozone transport extension policy placed
several important restrictions on its availability. In addition to making a
demonstration that the area was affected by ozone transport, the sources of
transport had to be located in an ozone nonattainment area with an attainment

Port Arthur). The St. Louis ozone nonattainment area has been bumped up, but EPA has
proposed to stay the effective date of this action in order to permit the agency to consider whether
the area is entitled to an extension of its 1996 attainment date. The agency proposes to withdraw
the reclassification if an extension is deemed appropriate. See 66 Fed. Reg. 15591 (Mar. 19,
2001). Similar proposals have been made for the Louisville and Beaumont-Port Arthur
nonattainment areas, although for these areas EPA has not yet issued a final rule.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(2)(A).
108. EPA has proposed to extend attainment deadlines for the following areas under its ozone
transport policy: Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas, see 64 Fed. Reg. 18864 (Apr. 16, 1999);
Louisville, Kentucky, see 64 Fed. Reg, 27734 (May 21, 1999); St. Louis, Missouri, see 64 Fed.
Reg. 13384 (March 18, 1999); Springfield, Massachusetts, 66 Fed. Reg. 666 (Jan. 3, 2001);
Washington, D.C., 66 Fed. Reg. 586 (Jan. 3, 2001); and Greater Connecticut, 66 Fed. Reg. 634
(Jan. 3, 2001). The Washington, Springfield, and Connecticut extensions are being challenged in
the D.C. Circuit. See Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 01-1070 (D.C. Cir.). In January 2001, a federal
district court ordered EPA to finalize its rulemaking concerning whether the St. Louis area
attained the ozone standard by 1996. Sierra Club v. Whitman, No. 98-2733 (CKK),
Memorandum Opinion and Order D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2001). EPA’s response to the court order is
found in two rulemakings. See 66 Fed. Reg. 15578 (Mar. 19, 2001); 66 Fed. Reg. 15591 (Mar.
19, 2001). In the interest of full disclosure, the author represents the plaintiffs in ongoing
litigation against EPA concerning the St. Louis area.
109. The statute does not authorize extensions for reasons of ozone transport. The statute
permits extensions under very limited circumstances, and only for a maximum of two years. See
42 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(5).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT

95

date that extended beyond the attainment date of the affected, downwind
area.110 The apparent rationale for this limitation was that the upwind state
was entitled to take advantage of the full length of its applicable attainment
period and should not be forced prematurely to implement control measures
not otherwise specifically required under the milestones program.111
Presumably, and in contrast, a downwind area with the same (or longer)
attainment period than the upwind area could properly insist that the upwind
state implement controls to mitigate ozone transport sufficiently to permit both
areas to meet their attainment deadlines.
A second important restriction on an area’s ability to secure an extension
due to ozone transport was that the area had to demonstrate that all the
requirements associated with the area’s classification had been adopted and
Thus, while the extension relieved the area of its
implemented.112
responsibilities to demonstrate attainment through local control measures alone
and to attain the NAAQS by the applicable statutory deadline, it did not relieve
the affected state of its responsibility to adopt and implement the control
measures specified for its applicable classification.
These limitations have now been largely abandoned, apparently due to
EPA’s decision to implement a regional solution to ozone transport in the form
of a massive “SIP call,”113 which requires several states to reduce emissions of
ozone precursors that contribute to nonattainment in other states.114 Of the

110. See Memorandum from Mary D. Nichols to Regional EPA Offices, Ozone
Nonattainment Dates for Areas Affected by Overwhelming Transport, attachment, at 1 (Aug. 30,
1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/tlpgm.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2001) (“The
attainment date may not be extended beyond the attainment date for the responsible upwind
area.”).
111. See id., attachment, at 6 (arguing that Congress did not intend for an upwind area’s
“obligation to prevent contribution to other nonattainment areas to supersede the practicable
attainment deadline and graduated control scheme”).
112. Id., attachment, at 2.
113. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63
Fed. Reg. 57356 (1998).
114. See Extension of Attainment Dates for Downwind Transport Areas, 64 Fed. Reg. 14441,
14443 (Mar. 25, 1999) (no longer requiring that upwind area in another state have later attainment
date and not requiring area seeking extension to implement otherwise applicable requirements
until “no later than the date by which the upwind reductions needed for attainment will be
achieved”). Under this approach, for example, a moderate area would not need to implement the
control measures in its rate of progress plan, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(b)(1)(A), until
years past the statutory requirement that such measures be implemented and the emissions
reductions achieved “within 6 years after November 15, 1990.” Id. In effect, EPA’s extension
policy grants areas extensions not only of their attainment dates but also of their obligations to
demonstrate progress toward attainment by achieving the specific emissions reductions spelled
out in the statute.
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areas for which EPA has proposed or granted an extension due to ozone
transport, none had fully implemented the applicable rate of progress control
requirements prior to the area’s statutory attainment date.115 None was
affected by ozone transport from an area with a higher classification; indeed,
some were affected by ozone transport from areas with lower classifications.
EPA’s explanation for abandoning the statutory deadlines governing
implementation of rate of progress control measures is somewhat astonishing.
The agency concluded that “requiring all local reductions to be implemented
prior to the time that upwind reductions are achieved would not accelerate
attainment,” and for that reason, need not be implemented prior to the upwind
reductions.116 When one commenter suggested that the control measures
would provide public health benefits prior to attainment, EPA responded that
none of the areas granted extensions “have delayed or postponed the
effectiveness of measures because their attainment date is being extended.”117
The idea seems to be that the only measure of a control measure’s
effectiveness is its ability to yield “attainment.” But this stands the rate of
progress plans and milestone requirements on their head. The point of these
control measures is to make progress toward attainment and to reduce peak
ozone concentrations as expeditiously as possible, even if the reductions are
not enough to reach attainment.
C. Slippage and the Critique of Uniform Federal Air Quality Standards
In light of the experience with the NAAQS under both the 1977 and 1998
amendments, criticisms of the NAAQS on the basis of their “uniformity” and,
to a lesser extent, their stringency fail to join theory with practice. My brief
review of the manner in which the Clean Air Act has been implemented
confirms Professor Farber’s conclusion that, “often, the supposed uniform
standards are both incomplete and under-enforced, with much state variation
the inevitable result.”118 Indeed, the extent of slippage between statutory
requirements and actual state obligations is so extensive and continuing that it
is virtually meaningless to speak of the efficiency losses associated with the
implementation of uniform standards. Moreover, the extent of slippage seems
to be more or less tailored to the particular circumstances of particular states
and localities, as with the extension policy for areas affected by ozone
transport. Accordingly, it is difficult to assess to what extent federal standards
have forced states to make improvements in environmental quality that they

115. See sources cited supra note 108.
116. 66 Fed. Reg. at 676.
117. Id. at 677 (Springfield extensions rulemaking); see 66 Fed. Reg. at 599 (Washington,
D.C., extension rulemaking); 66 Fed. Reg. at 645 (Connecticut extension rulemaking).
118. Farber, supra note 20, at 317.
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would not otherwise independently pursue. It is certain, however, that the
inefficiencies supposedly inflicted by the NAAQSs are not by virtue of their
uniformity, which is typically the only, or most significant, basis for criticism
invoked by scholars inspired by economism.
II. WHY FEDERAL AIR QUALITY STANDARDS?
Because federal air quality standards are uniform neither in form nor
practice, much of the economics-inspired criticism of the NAAQS is a bit of a
sport, at least to the extent that it is based on the simple assertion that federal
air quality standards utterly disregard variations in the respective costs of
pollution and pollution control throughout the nation. Nonetheless, it is hardly
satisfying to justify the NAAQS generally, and the ozone NAAQS in
particular, on the ground that they accomplish or approach a desired result
through indirection. Indeed, to this point, it has been assumed implicitly (or at
least not disputed) that critics of federal regulation are right in asserting that
the normatively appropriate unit for analysis is the state: The structure of
aggregated citizens’ preferences within the respective states, not the nation as a
whole, should determine appropriate levels of environmental quality. If this
assumption is deemed appropriate, then it makes little sense to defend federal
standards on the ground that they do not depart significantly from the choices
the citizens of the respective states would otherwise make for themselves.
Nonetheless, federal standards may be justified along two general lines of
argument. First, assuming that the states are presumptively appropriate
jurisdictions for regulating environmental quality, a number of factors may
frustrate state efforts to establish and enforce regulatory choices that reflect the
preferences of state residents. Second, the assumption that environmental
quality is a “local” good, rather than a “national” good can be challenged on
various grounds. In this section I examine these two, independent forms of
justification for federal air quality standards. I conclude that treating air
quality as a national good, subject to federal minimum standards is a
normatively more attractive approach than treating air quality as merely a
“local” good.
A.

Obstacles to Effective Environmental Regulation By States May Justify
Federal Standards

Consistent with the assumption that states are the preferred jurisdictional
unit for purposes of environmental policy, federal standards may nonetheless
be warranted on economic grounds. There are four widely recognized
problems that may prevent states from establishing and enforcing
environmental standards that mirror the aggregated preferences of their
citizens. These problems are: (1) environmental conditions that do not match
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up with any particular state’s geographic jurisdiction; (2) scientific and
technical issues; (3) race-to-the-bottom dynamics; and (4) public choice
problems.
1. Environmental Conditions That May Frustrate State Environmental
Standards: Interstate Externalities
In proposing greater reliance on states, critics of federal regulation often
link the normatively desirable, or “optimal” jurisdiction for regulation to the
geographical scope of environmental problems. On this view, if economic
activity within a particular state affects environmental conditions only in that
state, the appropriate jurisdictional unit should be the state, not the federal
government.119 Professors Butler and Macey have dubbed this approach the
“Matching Principle”:
The Matching Principle suggests that, in general, the size of the geographic
area affected by a specific pollution source should determine the appropriate
governmental level for responding to the pollution. There is no need for the
regulating jurisdiction to be larger than the regulated activity. In other words,
when a particular polluting activity is limited to a particular locality or state,
there is very little justification for federal environmental regulation.120

The operative assumption of those who advocate less federal
environmental regulation and greater reliance on states is that the geographic
reach of most environmental problems more closely matches the geographic
jurisdiction of states than that of the federal government. This assumption is
often just asserted with no supporting empirical data or developed argument.
Almost all critics of federal environmental regulation acknowledge, however,
that when pollution crosses state boundaries, state regulation of resident
pollution sources will not likely yield desired levels of environmental quality,

119. See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, Economic and Public-Choice Forces in Federalism, 6 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 921, 926-29 (1998); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New
Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86
Geo. L.J. 201, 231-32 (1997) (“In a theoretical first-best regime, the impact of all costs and
benefits of public goods production must be restricted to the providing jurisdiction.”). See
generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 113-16 (1965).
120. Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 25; see also Esty, supra note 17, at 587 (describing as
a “structural mismatch” a situation in which “the scope of an environmental harm does not match
the regulator’s jurisdiction”); Zerbe, supra note 16, at 204:
The question of the geographical extent of pollution damage is central to the question of
appropriate jurisdictions for environmental control. The more geographically widespread
the damages, the less satisfactory local control would be.
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at least in states affected by pollution from other states. Accordingly, federal
regulation may be desirable.121
In the presence of interstate pollution externalities, federal regulation is
necessary to arbitrate disputes among the states about how shared
environmental resources—e.g., airsheds and waters—are to be used. Absent
such regulation, “upwind” (or upstream) states will ignore pollution sent from
their state to “downwind” (or downstream) states because the upwind state
bears none of the costs of this pollution and controlling it would reduce the
benefits the upwind state enjoys from the economic activity that generates the
pollution.”122 Likewise, in the absence of federal regulation, regulators in states
affected by pollution sent from other states are powerless to control out-ofstate polluters and will thus be unable to maintain desired levels of
environmental quality or can do so only by imposing excessive burdens on
local economic activity. 123 Accordingly, regulatory decisions may be skewed
in favor of more pollution than would be warranted in the absence of interstate
pollution.
In considering the problem of externalities, the matching principle presents
several puzzles in application. Most importantly, the reach of environmental
problems cannot be determined simply by tracing the physical footprint of
economic activity. One obvious problem in this respect is that the federal
government manages as national goods many thousands of acres of land
located in the states, often because of the desirable environments these lands
contain. Economic activity within a state that spills pollution into federally
managed areas represents another, often significant form of inter-jurisdictional
externality.124 Conversely, many federal facilities are themselves significant
sources of pollution, often imposing negative externalities on nearby state
residents.125 On federal lands and federal facilities, no serious claim to

121. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 17, at 1215-16, 1226-27 (discussing
interstate pollution “spillovers”).
122. See Revesz, Interstate Externalities, supra note 17, at 2343 (an interstate externality
arises “because a state that sends pollution to another state obtains the labor and fiscal benefits of
the economic activity that generates the pollution but does not suffer the full costs of the
activity,” with the consequence that “an undesirably large amount of pollution will cross state
lines”).
123. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931,
932 (1997).
124. For example, the Clean Air Act includes special provisions for protecting visibility and
“air quality related values” for federal lands. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(d)(2) (protection for air
quality related values); §§ 7491-7492 (visibility protection); see also EPA, Regional Haze
Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 35714 (July 1, 1999) (rule to improve visibility in national parks and
wilderness areas).
125. See generally First Kassen, The Inadequacies of Congressional Attempts to Legislate
Federal Facility Compliance with Environmental Requirements, 54 MD. L. REV. 1475 (1995).
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exclusive decisional authority about levels of environmental quality can be
made by the residents of the state in which the federal property is located. The
preferences of these residents, while certainly relevant, are entitled to no
greater consideration than the preferences of all citizens of the nation.
A second circumstance in which the physical reach of environmental
problems may be an inappropriate guide for selecting a regulatory jurisdiction
involves circumstances where the economic effects of state decisions about
environmental quality do not coincide with the decision’s physical effects.126
These economic effects may involve negative or positive interstate
externalities. Even if no pollution crosses state lines, it may be appropriate to
consider the preferences of citizens from other states to ensure that resources
are devoted to their most highly valued uses.127 Citizens may place significant
value on environmental goods they use in areas other than their state of
residence—e.g., parks, waterbodies, wilderness area, and endangered
species.128 Unless these values are considered by state regulators, states may
fail to devote environmental resources to their most highly valued uses.
Where effective mechanisms exist for states to charge out-of-state
residents with some of the costs of providing quality environments—e.g.,
entrance fees or license charges—state regulators could be expected to take
“foreign” preferences into account in their regulatory decisions.129 For some
sorts of preferences, however—most controversially, nonuse values including
“option” and “existence” values130 and the preferences of future
generations131—the states lack effective cost-bearing mechanisms and the
relevant preferences will likely be ignored.132
126. See Zerbe, supra note 16, at 205-05; Esty, supra note 17, at 593-97.
127. See Zerbe, supra note 16, at 205 (“[T]he local environment may have and usually will
have value to nonresidents of the locality, even in the absence of interjurisdictional pollution.”).
128. See Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation:
A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 543 (1997) [hereinafter Response to Critics].
129. See Zerbe, supra note16, at 206-07.
130. Option values reflect an individual’s willingness-to-pay to preserve an environmental
resources for future use. [cite] Existence values are the amount an individual would pay to
preserve an environmental resource wholly aside from any present or future use that individual
may make of the resource. A related concept is “bequest” value—the amount an individual
would be willing to pay to preserve an environmental resource for the use of future generations.
For discussion, see Douglas R. Williams, Valuing Natural Environments: Compensation, Market
Norms, and the Idea of Public Goods, 27 CONN. L. REV. 365, 398-407 (1995).
131. See Swire, supra note 17, at 99-100.
132. Determining the geographic scope of environmental problems raises knotty problems of
measurement and valuation that cannot adequately be addressed here. But a simple example will
highlight the difficulty. Professors Butler and Macey argue that some non-use values based on
preferences held by out-of-staters should simply be factored out in considering the question of
regulatory jurisdiction. They posit a case in which Oregon residents are “deeply concerned”
about lax environmental regulation of chemical plants in Louisiana. See Butler & Macey, supra
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State regulatory decisions may also fail to yield desirable levels of
environmental quality, even when there are no inter-jurisdictional externalities.
Strong local preferences for environmental quality may be overridden by

note 12, at 30. Professors Butler and Macey assert that the harm to Oregonians can properly be
ignored because “the local residents in Louisiana, not the Oregon environmentalists, would bear
all the costs of reducing pollution.” Id. at 31. They imply that the harm experienced by
Oregonians is not an externality at all, asserting that “[a]llocation of regulatory authority over
local externalities to local governments allows decisions to be made by the representatives of
citizens who benefit the most from and the pay the most for higher environmental quality.” Id.
There are three nagging problems with this conclusion. First, we may assume that the
concerned Oregonians are willing to pay something (maybe not much) to achieve stricter
regulation in Louisiana. If willingness-to-pay is the proper indicator of an economic effect, it is
entirely unclear why some “harms”—such as though experienced by the Oregonians—should be
deemed externalities and others not. To make judgments of this sort is to engage in interpersonal
comparisons of utility, and as Professor, now-Judge Calabresi has observed, “the moment we are
willing to [do] that . . . we have introduced a nonunanimously held value into the scheme, and its
open season. . . . [T]here is no reason based in economics or efficiency why some such
comparisons should be allowed and others excluded.” Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of
Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1217 (1991).
Second, to the extent that the harm experienced by Oregonians is properly considered an
“externality,” exclusion of Oregonian preferences on the ground that Oregonians bear none of the
costs of protecting environmental values in Louisiana confuses allocative efficiency with
distributive justice. This is a surprising claim from Professors Butler and Macey, for the question
of how the costs and benefits of environmental quality are distributed is generally treated by
economics-inspired scholars like Professors Butler and Macey as different from the question of
how much environmental quality should be provided. On the distinction between allocative
efficiency and distributive effects, see generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 12-13 (3d ed. 1986).
It may seem odd to state that the preferences of Oregonians should be weighed equally
with the preferences of Louisianans by Louisiana regulators. And, indeed, it is an odd
conclusion, for Louisiana regulators are, by definition, representatives only of residents of
Louisiana. If state representatives consistently based regulatory decisions on overriding
preferences of non-Louisianans, it is likely that those representatives would soon find themselves
out of work, as Louisiana voters make their preferences known at the voting booth. But viewing
the issue in this way already assumes away the critical normative issue—namely, determining
who is entitled to share in the benefits and who may be required to bear the costs of
environmental protection, and which jurisdiction is the appropriate one to regulate. If
environmental quality in Louisiana is viewed as a national good, then no mismatch between those
holding preferences about environmental quality in Louisiana and the regulatory jurisdiction
arises.
The third problem has to do with who bears the costs of more stringent regulation.
Tracing how the increased costs of stricter environmental regulation in Louisiana will be
distributed is tricky. The costs might be borne entirely by the shareholders of the chemical
companies facing such costs; they may be borne by the consumers of the products marketed by
the affected firms; or they may be borne by the firms’ employees in the form of lower
compensation. In some cases, (as with shareholders and consumers), most of the costs might be
borne by citizens of states other than Louisiana.
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contrary aggregate state-wide preferences. Professor Esty has described this
situation as one involving “internalities”—mismatches between the regulating
jurisdiction and the environmental problem that arise “[w]hen the jurisdiction
is broader than the scope of the public good in question.”133 He offers the
example of a local population that wishes to build a park and is willing to bear
the costs of doing so, but is frustrated by a jurisdiction-wide referendum that
rejects the park proposal.134 Where such internalities are present, state
regulation may be subject to the same sorts of criticism that advocates of state
regulation currently raise against federal regulation—namely, that it ignores
variations in the costs of pollution and pollution control from locality to
locality within a state.
For air quality standards, the factors discussed above may frustrate state
efforts to make trade-offs between environmental quality and economic
activity. Most significantly, air pollution may generate significant interjurisdictional externalities. Many air pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxides, and ozone and its precursors, travel long distances,
contributing to environmental degradation in states other than the state of
origin.135 The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments addressed the problem of
interstate acid deposition by creating an innovative “cap and trade” program,
employing marketable permits, to reduce aggregate emissions of acid-forming
pollutants.136 And EPA has finally acted to reduce interstate transport of ozone
precursors through a demand for amendments to a large number of state
implementation plans.137 Some air pollution problems, such as global climate
change and stratospheric ozone depletion, clearly transcend even national

133. Esty, supra note 17, at 588.
134. Id.
135. Professors Butler and Macey argue that “smog and local air pollution are local
problems.” Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 54. They do not, however, cite any empirical
support for this assertion, which is plainly erroneous. It is now well known that smog is a
regional air quality problem caused by interstate transport of pollutants. See generally OZONE
TRANSPORT ASSESSMENT GROUP, FINAL REPORT, at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/rto/otag/finalrpt/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2001).
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o. See generally Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The
Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L.
& ECON. 37 (1998).
137. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63
Fed. Reg. 57,356 (1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96 (2000)). Information on this
program and related programs can be found on the web at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/
progsregs/noxview.html (last visited June 6, 2001); see also Patricia Ross McCubbin, Michigan
v. EPA, Interstate Ozone Pollution and EPA’s “NOx SIP Call,” 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 45
(2001).
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boundaries.138 Protection of air quality in federal lands also may place
significant constraints on a state’s ability to choose air quality standards that
permit more pollution than is currently allowed under the federal ambient
standards.139
Under these conditions, federal regulation of air quality is warranted.140
Yet the form of federal regulation remains controversial. Many supporters of
state regulation argue that, in circumstances where it is warranted, federal
regulation should displace state preferences as little as possible.141 This view,
however, is inconsistent with the notion that the size of the pollution problem
should determine the appropriate regulatory jurisdiction. Where air resources
are essentially shared among residents of two or more states, arguments for
respecting divergent state preferences about the use of the resource make sense
only if something other than the matching principle is at work. Indeed, where
resources are shared, as Ronald Coase famously demonstrated, the problem is
not one of “spillovers,” but of incompatible uses.142 In such circumstances, the
most difficult questions are likely not to concern appropriate levels of
environmental quality—although this question will obviously remain
essential—but rather, how the costs of reducing pollution are distributed to
achieve a welfare maximizing result.
Consider, for example, a circumstance in which two states, A and B, share
an air resource. For simplicity, assume that there are only two sources of
pollution—SA, (located in state A), and SB (located in state B)—and only one
pollutant—pollutant X. Assume further that both sources, if unregulated,
would make the following contributions to ambient levels of X in states A and
B (expressed as parts of pollution per million parts of air (ppm)):

138. See generally Framework Convention on Climate Change, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992);
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987).
139. See generally Craig Oren The Protection of Parklands from Air Pollution: A Look at
Current Policy, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (1989).
140. Professor Revesz explains why, absent federal regulation, states would not likely be able
to resolve disputes among themselves about interstate air pollution in an effective or efficient
manner. See Revesz, Interstate Externalities, supra note 17, at 2375 & n.123; see also Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 17, at 1216 (1977).
141. See Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 36-37, 42.
142. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also
STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 7 (4th ed. 1999)
(noting that “Coase’s suggestion, now widely accepted within economics, is that the harmful
effects of pollution should not be seen as externalities “ but rather as “result[ing] from a large
number of acts and omissions on both sides”).
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SA

CONTRIBUTION TO
AMBIENT X
POLLUTION IN
STATE A
7 ppm

CONTRIBUTION TO
AMBIENT X
POLLUTION IN
STATE B
5 ppm

SB

8 ppm

10 ppm

Under these simplified assumptions, and absent any regulation, ambient
levels of X would be 15 ppm in both states. Suppose State A has a taste for air
of high quality and has chosen to set a standard for X at 8 ppm. To achieve
this standard, ambient concentrations of the pollutant will have to be reduced
by 7 ppm. State B cares less about air quality, favoring greater economic
activity, and has selected a standard of 12 ppm. To achieve this standard,
ambient concentrations must be reduced by 3 ppm. In these circumstances, by
how much should each source be required to reduce its emissions of pollutant
X?
Without knowing more about the costs and benefits, no determinate
conclusion about a welfare-maximizing result can be reached.143 Each state
might argue that its standard is designed to permit the existing source in its
jurisdiction to operate without restriction, while preserving a margin for further
economic growth. State A would argue that SB should be required to reduce
its contribution to ambient X in state A entirely, to protect state A’s chosen
margin for growth. The same argument could be made by state B with respect
to SA’s contribution to pollution in state B. Both might well founder under the
Supreme Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, which generally
prohibits the states from discriminating between in-state and out-of-state
industries in pursuing environmental objectives.144 Importantly, however, it is
the federally chosen distribution of pollution reduction requirements that will,
to a considerable extent, affect the mix of environmental quality and economic
activity within each state, even if the states retain responsibility for their
respective ambient standards.
One possibility for resolving this problem would be the use of marketable
permits, but this solution may frustrate states’ efforts to achieve a desired mix

143. For suggestions on appropriate resolutions for interstate pollution, adopting a “golden
rule” approach, see Merrill, supra note 123.
144. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (invalidating
differential fees for disposal or treatment of out-of-state and in-state hazardous waste);
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating ban on disposal of out-of-state
waste). For a discussion of how dormant commerce clause principles might be invoked to resolve
interstate air pollution problems, see Revesz, Interstate Externalities, supra note 17, at 23982409.
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of environment quality and economic activity. Each state could issue permits
representing the total amount of pollution it is willing to tolerate. Each permit
would allow a source to make a specified contribution to the concentration of a
pollutant in the ambient air. The permits then would be freely transferable
among sources and each source’s pollutant emissions would be restricted to the
amount specified in the permits each source holds.145 Under this system, most
of the permits to pollute in state A could end up being held by sources in state
B, frustrating state A’s attempts to fine tune its environmental standards to
promote a specified level of economic activity, while permitting state B to
externalize some of the environmental costs of its greater economic activity.146
Moreover, it may turn out that controls on sources located in state B sufficient
to attain the more stringent state A standards could not be fine-tuned in ways
that would permit full exploitation of state B’s less stringent standards. In such
a case, state A has to some extent externalized the costs of its more stringent
environmental standards to state B.
Minimum federal ambient standards do not necessarily solve the problem
of how to distribute the costs of pollution control among sources of interstate
pollution. They do, however, minimize opportunities for states to externalize
the costs of their choices regarding environmental standards. Federal standards
are also consistent with the view that the jurisdiction with regulatory authority
ought to be large enough to include all individuals who suffer costs or receive
benefits from the activity to be regulated.

145. For a general discussion of marketable permit programs, see Robert W. Hahn & Gordon
L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 364-65
(1989).
146. The result stated in the text is analogous to the problem of “hot spots”—the costs of
pollution are concentrated in a particular area—that can develop from a system of pollution
control employing marketable permits. See generally Richard T. Drury et al., Pollution Trading
and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231, 251-57, 271-73 (1999) (discussing problem of “hot spots” arising
from Los Angeles pollution trading program); Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do
Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 111, 118 (1999) (discussing how market-based mechanisms of pollution control may
concentrate the costs of pollution unfairly).
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2. Scientific and Technical Issues: Economies of Scale
One of the more pressing problems of environmental regulation and policy
concerns the appropriate response to significant uncertainties about both the
health and environmental effects of economic activity and the costs and
benefits of addressing such effects. The costs of producing data about the
relative health and environmental risks of various pollutants, the costs of
reducing pollution, and the benefits likely to be realized from undertaking such
reductions, when such data is available (and often it is not available), can be
quite high. Centralizing these information gathering and disseminating
functions at the national level may yield significant scale economies.147
Critics of federal regulation acknowledge that scale economies may
support a federal role in environmental regulation. They contend, however,
that the presence of scale economies merely supports federal production and
dissemination of the relevant data, not standards-setting functions. 148 On this
view, the federal government could perform the basic data gathering and
analysis, exploiting scale economies, while leaving the states free to use the
data and analysis in making independent policy decisions about whether and
what extent to regulate identified hazards.
This response seems sensible, and may in fact yield substantial benefits.
There are, however, several significant features about environmental
regulation, information assessment, and policy-making that make this sharp
distinction between fact-based inquiries (information gathering and
assessment) and value-based judgments (standards-setting) problematic. First,
choices about which environmental hazards to investigate and assess are
themselves policy choices.149 To a considerable degree, then, vesting
informational and technical capacities in the federal government necessitates a
strong federal role in deciding what may be regulated and what may not.150
Second, the processes of risk assessment and risk-benefit analysis are not
normatively neutral. A variety of critical policy issues are internal to these
processes, blurring the distinction between risk assessment and risk

147. See Esty, supra note 17, at 613-16 (discussing economies of scale in technical matters);
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 17, at 1212.
148. See Revesz, Response to Critics, supra note 128, at 543-44.
149. On setting an environmental regulatory “agenda,” see EPA, SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD,
REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
(1990); John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in
Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277 (1992).
150. Instructive in this respect is the experience of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration’s regulation of toxic exposures in the workplace. See generally Sidney A.
Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative
Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1989).
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management.151 Thus, the data provided to states will be the product of
important policy choices. As a consequence, to truly reflect state judgments of
the relative value of greater or lesser environmental protection, state standards
would have to be the product of information gathering processes that are
themselves normatively endorsed by the state. This, in turn, would require
either more finely tuned federal assessment procedures or a decentralized
approach to risk assessment and risk-benefit analysis. Either approach would
defeat any economies of scale that would attend federal assessment processes.
Third, the process of setting and implementing environmental standards is
itself enormously resource intensive. A typical major EPA rulemaking may
involve years of study, an extended period for public participation, and a
lengthy and costly process of judicial review. For example, EPA’s efforts to
implement a staged ban of asbestos products extended over nearly ten years
and involved a 45,000-page administrative record.152 In addition, the
rulemaking prompted congressional hearings and an acrimonious battle
between the Office of Management and Budget and Congress. Despite the
extended efforts of EPA, the asbestos ban was set aside by the Fifth Circuit,
largely because the court believed that EPA had taken too many shortcuts in
analyzing the hazards posed by asbestos and the ways in which the associated
risks might justifiably be managed.153 This process is repeated in most of
EPA’s important rulemakings, often involving remands to the agency from
reviewing courts and extended and costly delays in implementation.
Reliance on state standards would significantly increase aggregate costs of
implementing those standards. It can be expected that regulated parties and
regulatory beneficiaries would demand (and most likely receive) extensive
participation rights in state standard-setting processes, including opportunities
to seek judicial review of those standards. These costs, aggregated over fifty
or more jurisdictions could reach staggering levels. Federal standards, by
contrast, significantly reduce these transaction costs. It is, of course, an open
question whether the higher transaction costs associated with state-centered
regulation would be offset by the cost savings associated with (presumably)

151. See generally Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995) (describing how “trans-scientific” issues involve mix of science and
policy); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON
REG. 89, 105 (1988) (same); see, e.g., Lester Lave, Benefit Cost Analysis: Do the Benefits Exceed
the Costs?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 104 (Robert Hahn ed., 1996), reproduced in
BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND
CASES 181-82 (4th ed. 1999).
152. See PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 458
(3d ed. 2000).
153. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
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more efficient standards. Nonetheless, a credible case can be made that
significant economies inhere in federal standards.
3.

Race-to-the Bottom Dynamics

A long-voiced justification for federal environmental standards is that they
prevent states from competing with each other for economic activity by
relaxing environmental standards and thereby offering lower location costs to
industry. Such competition is undesirable if it prompts states to select
suboptimal environmental standards to attract geographically mobile industry.
Where this undesirable result obtains, competition among the states may
resemble a prisoners’ dilemma game, resulting in a “race-to-the-bottom.”154
The race-to-the-bottom rationale for federal environmental regulation has
been seriously tested in recent years. Indeed, the scholarly literature has
divided on the question whether regulatory competition among the states
would yield a race-to-the-bottom. Professor Richard Revesz, relying primarily
on a model developed by Wallace Oates and Robert Schwab,155 has argued that
“the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, though influential, lacks a sound
theoretical basis.”156 On this view, a market in which states compete by
offering location rights to mobile capital should be viewed no differently than
a market involving firms selling widgets; regulatory competition will tend
toward an optimal mix of economic activity and environmental quality.157
By contrast, a number of scholars have argued that the stringent
assumptions needed to demonstrate efficiency gains from state regulatory
competition render these competitive models utterly irrelevant to critical policy
choices.158 Others have gathered empirical evidence that is suggestive, but not
conclusive of a race-to-the-bottom.159 Finally, it has been shown in some

154. See Swire, supra note 17, at 68; Revesz, Race-to-the-Bottom, supra note 22, at 1210;
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 17, at 1211-12.
155. See Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among
Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988).
156. Revesz, Race-to-the-Bottom, supra note 22, at 1244.
157. Id. at 1234-35.
158. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 119 (surveying and criticizing the demanding
assumptions of models of regulatory competition); Swire, supra note 17, at 94 (concluding that
the assumptions needed to demonstrate that regulatory competition will yield efficient outcomes
“are strongly counterfactual” and noting that “[e]nvironmental law is largely defined by the very
factors that are assumed away in the models”).
159. See Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical
Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate Over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental
Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998); Holly M. Hock, Interstate
Competition for Jobs and Industry Through Laxity of Environmental Regulations: Pennsylvania’s
Response and the Effects, 7 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 263 (1998); Kirsten H. Engel, State
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circumstances state regulation may lead to a “race-to-the-top,”160 although
those circumstances are probably extremely limited.161
Professor Swire, for example, has noted that the problems most likely to
frustrate the efficient functioning of regulatory competition—resulting in
“market failure”—are those that independently support federal environmental
regulation—namely, “interstate externalities, deep public choice problems, and
intractable theoretical and practical obstacles to measuring the social utility of
environmental regulations.”162 Professors Bratton and McCahery pose a more
fundamental theoretical difficulty for regulatory competition models that
promise greater efficiency. They argue that given the incentives faced by state
regulators, “one cannot assume an entrepreneurial state”—i.e., that states will
actually be motivated to compete in the manner specified in the regulatory
competition models.163 A more plausible model would “substitute[] an
incentive picture in which market competition shares a place with the
conventional political factors of interest-group influence and voter
accountability.”164
It may very well be that any possibility of a race-to-the-bottom could be
eliminated by simply addressing the problem that creates the resulting market
failure—if, with Professor Swire, we assume that such market failures provide
the critical conditions under which a race-to-the-bottom develops.165 Indeed,
in attacking the race-to-the-bottom rationale for federal regulation, Professor
Revesz insists that problems such as interstate externalities and public choice
shortcomings should be kept “analytically distinct” from race-to-the-bottom
problems.166 Professors Bratton and McCahery have similarly argued that the
“[t]he race-to-the-bottom concept should be retired because it does not provide
an effective basis for challenging weak claims for competitive benefits.”167
Instead, proponents of federal regulation should focus on the weakness in
claims of benefits associated with regulatory competition among the states.
To some extent, Professor Revesz’s insistence on keeping race-to-thebottom arguments analytically distinct from other problems that may plague

Environmental Standard-SETTING: Is There A “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997).
160. DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995).
161. See Swire, supra note 17, at 80-87.
162. Id.
163. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 119, at 238.
164. Id. at 239.
165. See Swire, supra note 17, at 95 (noting that “[t]he presence of serious market failures in
competition among the states undermines any claim that the competition is efficient.”).
166. Revesz, Response to Critics, supra note 128, at 546.
167. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 119, at 264.
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state regulation “loads the dice;” if all market failures are simply assumed
away, efficient outcomes are, by definition, guaranteed. The more appropriate
question might be whether, in the presence of market failures like interstate
externalities, federal regulation that eliminates or reduces states’ abilities to
compete through environmental regulation yields greater or lesser net benefits
than more targeted federal responses. Unfortunately, this question has
received scant attention and is not likely to be subject to determinate
resolution.
Interstate transport of ozone and ozone precursors, as noted above, is likely
to frustrate efforts by states to establish optimal environmental standards, and
this market failure could lead to competition among states that yields
suboptimal levels of ozone. Federal efforts to correct this specific market
failure, without imposing minimum federal standards, may be unsuccessful in
the presence of competition for industry among affected states.
Given the absence of a consensus on the race-to-the-bottom question, one
way to imagine the issues is to consider which rule—federal or state
regulation—should obtain in the face of uncertainty about the welfare effects
of either rule. Most proponents of state regulation, assume that since
competition is presumptively welfare-enhancing, we should favor any rule that
increases the opportunities for regulatory competition. On the other hand,
competition is beneficial only in the absence of significant market failures and
it is by no means clear that limited federal intervention, targeted to address
specific sorts of market failure will successfully achieve the desired correction.
Moreover, devolution to the states represents a significant departure from the
status quo, and as such, might be thought to require a rather compelling
justification. Indeed, federalism debates now have largely devolved into
arguments about default rules, a point I address below.
4. Public Choice Issues
Another widely invoked justification for federal standards is that
systematic distortions in state political processes will result in undesirably lax
environmental standards. Put another way, there is widespread skepticism that
state regulators will select environmental standards that undervalue
environmental quality relative to the value placed on environmental quality by
state residents.
The chief reasons that states are more likely than the federal government to
undervalue environmental quality have to do with the differing political
dynamics as between the states and the federal government. It is frequently
noted that, under standard public choice models, one would expect very little
environmental regulation because the costs of such regulation are generally
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very concentrated while the benefits are diffuse.168 Thus, the standard public
choice story is that industry, which generally bears the highest costs of
environmental regulation, will be able to organize and influence regulatory
outcomes to a much greater extent than the beneficiaries of environmental
regulation, each of whom receives relatively small benefits and thus will be
inclined to free-ride on the efforts of others.169
If, despite the predictions of public choice theory, there has been steady
production of environmental regulation by the federal government, one might
be disposed to dismiss public choice arguments leveled against state
regulation. On this view, public choice problems at the state level should
presumptively be no greater than public choice problems at the federal level.170
Nonetheless, there may be reasons to suspect otherwise. Professor Swire, for
example, argues that public choice problems are much more likely to result in
undervaluations of environmental quality at the state level than they are the
federal level for three reasons. First, Professor Swire contends that states are
more likely to seek to externalize the costs of environmental regulation to other
states and to future generations than the federal government. 171 Second, he
suggests that the beneficiaries of environmental regulation will find it much
more difficult to influence state regulators than will industry because of
information asymmetries and incentives.172 Finally, Professor Swire notes that
information asymmetries may also lead regulators to favor polluters, who can
effectively monitor the effects of regulatory decisions, over the public
generally, which cannot effectively monitor such effects.173
Another public choice problem that is likely to be greatly more prominent
at the state level than at the federal level also has to do with the distributive
impacts of regulatory decisions. This problem does not involve information
asymmetries, but rather, involves those cases in which the distributional issues
are quite salient. In such circumstances, the decision costs to state regulators
168. See, e.g., Stewart, National Good, supra note 17, at 199.
169. The classic exposition of these collective action problems is MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). For more
recent treatments, see Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 59 (1992).
170. But see Andrew J. Green, Public Participation, Federalism and Environmental Law, 6
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 169 (1999) (study comparing Canadian and American environmental law
attributes greater stringency in American law due to centralization; decentralization hampers
ability of environmental groups to participate meaningfully in policy formation); Warren L.
Ratliff, The De-Evolution of Environmental Organization, 17 J. LAND RES. & ENVTL. L. 45
(1997) (arguing that public choice problems will lead states to enact weal environmental
standards).
171. Swire, supra note 17, at 99-100.
172. Id. at 100-103; see also Esty, supra note 17, at 597-99.
173. Swire, supra note 17, at 103-04.
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are likely to be quite high, encouraging evasion. The result may be an
undesirable bias toward the status quo, neglecting opportunities for welfare
gains.
The classic example is the NIMBY, or “not-in-my-backyard,”
phenomenon.174 A simple illustration shows how, in a NIMBY dynamic, sharp
distributional issues can frustrate welfare-enhancing moves. Assume that if a
state reduces its environmental standards, it will successfully induce a large
manufacturing facility to locate within the state’s borders. The manufacturing
facility will, when fully complying with the state’s reduced environmental
standards, generate significant amounts of air and water pollution. The costs
of this pollution are known to be forty units of welfare. It is also known that
pollution from existing sources will increase from the change in standards,
imposing pollution costs of an additional forty units of welfare. The benefits to
be gained by the sale of location rights to the facility are known to be 100 units
of welfare. The facility seeks to locate in a small, economically prosperous
town that currently hosts no other significant sources of pollution. Of the
benefits gained from the sale of location rights, the citizens of the small town
will collectively enjoy only twenty units of welfare, with the remaining 80
units distributed throughout the state. The small town will, however, suffer
most of the pollution costs—say, thirty units of welfare. Finally, we might
also posit that in relaxing standards for existing sources, benefits from
increased economic activity will amount to ten units of welfare, distributed
mostly outside the small town where the new facility seeks to locate. While
the sale of location rights is welfare enhancing in the aggregate (a net gain of
thirty welfare units), the costs and benefits are distributed in ways to create
sharply concentrated losers and widely dispersed winners. As the logic of
collective action suggests, in these circumstances those suffering the
concentrated costs are more likely to organize and resist the change than are
the citizens who will enjoy the benefits. Presumably, however, the sale will go
forward if, but only if, the citizens can agree on a way to redistribute some of
the widely dispersed gains to the small town to compensate those who would
otherwise suffer welfare losses in the form of pollution costs. More likely, the
citizens of the small town will succeed in blocking the sale of location rights.
Even if we assume that the sale would eventually go forward, no economic
principle warrants an assumption that this resolution could be achieved in ways
that do not themselves involve significant costs. Proponents of state regulation
thus assume away what is perhaps the critical question. The theory thus makes
an implausible “no transactions costs” assumption—an assumption I had hoped

174. For discussion of NIMBY problems as a species of public choice problems, see Swire,
supra note 17, at 105-06.
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had banished from serious legal scholarship long ago.175 When the transaction
costs are very high, it may be that decision makers—including private actors
seeking to benefit by changes in environmental standards—will simply forego
desirable changes to avoid such costs.
The sharp distributional issues sometimes associated with decisions
regarding environmental quality may also explain why federal regulation may
be desirable. Indeed, state regulators might well be inclined to externalize the
political costs of such decisions by urging federal regulation. As Professor
Dwyer notes, “[s]ome [state] officials may think that federal responsibility for
basic policy decisions will help them to deflect political criticism and
controversy (‘The Feds made me do it.’).”176 Because federal authorities are
somewhat more removed from the actual conflict, they do not face the same
inhibiting structure of political incentives faced by state regulators. The result
may be regulation that more closely is aligned with the longer-term “public
interest” than state regulation would be.177
B.

Jurisdictional Choice in an Imperfect World: Air Quality as a National
Good

Many of the proponents of devolution make a number of assumptions that
are contestable. Most strikingly, many extol the efficiency gains to be had
from state, rather than federal, environmental regulation. They assume that
some of the worst features (from a utilitarian welfarist perspective) of federal
environmental regulation—its lack of flexibility and inattention to varying
costs and benefits—will magically disappear or, at the least, will not be
exacerbated if environmental regulation is handed to the states wholesale. The
foregoing discussion shows why such an assumption should not simply be
accepted on faith, given the relatively high stakes at issue in environmental
federalism debates. Yet, even if one accepts that one or more of the problems
discussed above—interstate externalities, information costs, market
imperfections, race-to-the-bottom dynamics, and public choice problems—
would render state regulation less than optimal, it is by no means clear that
minimum federal standards are the right response. From a utilitarian welfarist
perspective, the question appropriately might be phrased in terms of which
imperfections—those at the state or federal level—pose the greatest threat to
welfare.178

175. See generally Calabresi, supra note 132.
176. See Dwyer, supra note 45, at 1220 n.177.
177. See Sarnoff, supra note 17, at 288 (“Federal regulation may be inherently more
“public-regarding” than state regulation because smaller geographical units will not formulate
sound policy due to factional pressures.”).
178. See Swire, supra note 17, at 95.
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Unfortunately, answers to this question are just as ambiguous as the
answers to questions about whether and what sorts of “market failures” afflict,
or are likely to afflict, state and federal regulation, respectively. In such
circumstances, jurisdictional choice might be premised on more generalized
considerations, which support a presumption in favor of either federal or state
regulation. This is essentially the conclusion of Professor Revesz. He
acknowledges that his “starting point is a rebuttable presumption in favor of
decentralization,”179 and rests his charges against federal regulation on the
grounds it lacks substantial justification. By contrast, Professors Bratton and
McCahery argue that existing economic models offer no real support for the
proposition that state regulation will yield efficient outcomes; accordingly,
proponents of regulatory competition should be required to bear the burden of
demonstrating that devolution will likely result in efficiency gains over federal
regulation.180 Bratton and McCahery thus suggest that it is changes from the
status quo that need justification, not the status quo itself.
In my view, Bratton and McCahery have the better argument. While there
are no doubt some troubling problems with federal environmental regulation, it
is not at all clear that those problems relate primarily to the choice of mediaquality standards; instead, the greatest inefficiencies of federal regulation more
likely lie with policy instruments chosen to achieve the standards.181 With
respect to ozone, the staggering number of citizens who continue to be exposed
to unhealthy air makes the suggestion that federal standards are too strict
somewhat implausible.
The reasons offered by Professor Revesz in support of his presumption
favoring decentralization are not compelling. First, he states that because the
nation is “large and diverse, . . . it is . . . likely that different regions have

179. Revesz, Response to Critics, supra note 128, at 536.
180. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 119, at 205.
181. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Goals, Instruments, and
Environmental Policy Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. & POL’Y F. 297, 300 (2000):
The literature on environmental policy does not always carefully distinguish between the
issues raised by the question of how to set the desired level of environmental protection
and the question of how to choose among the available instruments for achieving the goal
that has been established. This blurring of the conceptually distinct questions of how to
set the goal and how to achieve it has prompted criticisms of existing environmental
regulatory programs that may not be justified. It has made defensible choices of
environmental policy-makers appear to be irrational. In particular, the blurring of the two
questions tends to mask the possibility that an environmental policy goal might be set
using criteria other than economic efficiency, but that, once the goal has been established,
regulators may select the policy instrument likely to achieve that goal at the least cost.
See also Stewart, National Good, supra note 17, at 213 (describing “grievous flaws” in the
manner in which federal environmental standards are pursued, while acknowledging that
environmental quality can plausibly be viewed as a “national good”).
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different preferences for environmental protection.”182 Second, Professor
Revesz notes that “benefits of environmental protection . . . vary throughout
the country.”183 Third, he notes that the costs of meeting a given standard also
differ across geographic regions.”184 For these reasons, he believes that state
regulation is more likely than federal regulation to reflect the varying
preferences of citizens.185
In respect to the diversity of preferences point, the notion that “regions”
have diverse preferences for environmental quality is a confusing one and
tends to obscure the relevant inquiry. Individual citizens, not regions, have
preferences about environmental quality and it is these preferences that, from a
utilitarian welfarist perspective, should control. Professor Revesz’s point is
that aggregated preferences will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as will
the collective decisions about environmental quality. He assumes that
collective decisions will more likely reflect the diversity of preferences as the
size of the jurisdiction decreases. Additionally, however, for Professor
Revesz’s diversity point to support the notion that state decisions about
environmental quality are more likely to reflect differences in preferences
across the nation, citizens’ preferences must become relatively more
homogeneous at the state level than they are at the federal level. By contrast, if
citizens’ preferences for environmental quality vary within states as much and
in relatively the same proportions as they do across states, it cannot be
assumed that state decisions will be significantly more efficient than will
national decisions.
The assumption that citizens’ preferences are relatively more homogenous
at the state level than they are at the national level is unwarranted for many,
perhaps most, states. Some states are also quite large, with populations
holding a diverse range of environmental preferences. Indeed, there may well
be as much variation in preferences among citizens within the respective states
as there are among citizens within the nation as a whole. In these
circumstances, one cannot merely assume that vesting decisional authority in
the states will yield a regulatory regime that is more responsive to the diverse
preferences of the citizenry than a national regulatory program of minimum
environmental standards. Even if some states would arrive at collective
decisions about air quality that are significantly less stringent than the current
minimum federal standards, the number of states reaching such a conclusion is
likely to be very small. As a result, any gains to be had from a closer match

182.
183.
184.
185.

Revesz, Response to Critics, supra note 128, at 536.
Id.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 536.
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between standards and citizens’ preferences might be vastly overwhelmed by
the transaction costs associated with decentralized decision making.
The issue of varying benefits and costs likewise raises important empirical
questions about variances among and within jurisdictions. The benefits and
costs of environmental regulation are surely not uniform across any state. As
Professor Revesz himself notes, “a stringent ambient standard may benefit
many people in densely populated areas but only a few elsewhere.”186
Population density, of course, varies as much within many states as it does
among states. Likewise, the costs of meeting a state-wide environmental
standard are likely to vary quite as much within some states as they do within
the nation. If this is right, it seems difficult to conclude that state standards
will yield significant welfare gains over federal standards, for state standards
might ignore the differences in costs and benefits to the same extent as federal
standards.
Even if the foregoing points are deemed unpersuasive, the presumption in
favor of state regulation presented by Professor Revesz rests decisively on
presumed welfare effects and these effects are assessed by a utilitarian costbenefit criterion. The implicit assumption is that, although current federal
regulation rejects this approach to setting air quality standards, all (or most)
states would select policy tools that seek to achieve greater efficiency along
this utilitarian vector. That is, arguments for devolution premised on the
desirability of achieving more efficient standards assume that citizens would
prefer state regulators to make trade-offs between environmental quality and
economic growth that current federal law prohibits. The basis for this
assumption is nowhere presented. The citizens of the nation as a whole have
chosen to base air quality standards only on health effects, precluding
consideration of the costs of achieving the selected standards.187 Why should
one assume that, if disaggregated by state, citizens preferences would be
distributed in ways that would permit a minority view (nationally)—one in
which the costs of air quality become a centrally important issue—to emerge
as a majority view at the state level? Absent a convincing explanation of how
federal air quality standards are a distortion of citizens’ “real” preferences, the
more likely conclusion is that citizens would continue to hold the same
preferences, regardless of whether it is the state or the federal government that
is doing the regulating. While there may be some differences among the states
about what standard is deemed sufficient to protect public health, such
186. Id. at 536-37.
187. See Whitman, 121 S. Ct. at 903. Public opinion polls revealed that, in 2000, two-thirds
of voters preferred that air quality standards be strict enough to protect asthmatics, children, and
older citizens—the populations most sensitive to zone. Moreover, nearly 70% of voters preferred
that air quality standards be based solely on health considerations, without regard to costs. See,
e.g., at http://www.cleanairtrust.org/realize.122600.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2001).
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differences would not be due to differing preferences, costs, and benefits
among the various states, and any variation is likely to be rather small.
Moreover, it is difficult to make any theoretical conclusions about the
comparative efficiency of diverse “health-based” standards relative to federal
minimum standards. Most likely, however, there would be substantial
economies of scale to be had from federal regulation.
The overwhelming preferences of citizens appear to favor air quality
standards based solely on the health effects of pollutants also supports a more
direct criticism of those who support regulatory competition among the states.
The concern of citizens is not that air quality standards be “efficient”; citizens
apparently want an entitlement to healthy air. To make such an entitlement
portable, permitting citizens to move freely around the country without fear
that their “right” will be compromised, national minimum air quality standards
are an effective option.188
It may be true that the same citizens who voice a preference for such an
entitlement may object when the costs of achieving such standards begin to
have a discernible impact on them. But, nationally, citizens have largely
acquiesced in bearing these costs; indeed, a significant majority voice concern
that air quality standards are not tough enough and that current standards are
under-enforced.189
Moreover, efforts to select more efficient standards may founder on the
limits of current technologies for making credible assessments of the welfare
effects of varying standards. The costs and benefits of achieving minimum
federal air quality standards, particularly in the longer term, are quite
uncertain, both as an empirical matter and from the perspective of selecting an
appropriate methodology for assessment.190 Accordingly, when one speaks of
the costs and benefits of various air quality standards, one is really making an
educated guess about a number of critically important factors. To date,
forward-looking estimates of the costs of achieving environmental standards
have been notoriously unreliable, and generally have been biased in the

188. Professor Stewart, reviewing public opinion polls, has concluded that “the public wants
both the federal and the state governments to play a substantial role in environmental protection,
according a clear preferences to neither. The public . . . seems to favor this redundancy as
p[roviding greater assurance of effective environmental protection.” Stewart, National Good,
supra note 17, at 214-15.
189. See, e.g., at http:www.cleanairtrust.org/release.122600.html (last visited March 1, 2001).
190. For recent discussions on appropriate methodologies for assessing regulatory costs and
benefits, see Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 323 (2001) (concluding that because existing methods ignore relative economic
position, they are likely to understate regulatory benefits significantly); David M. Driesen, The
Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24
ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 587-605 (1997) (discussing theoretical problems of cost-benefit analysis).
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direction of vastly overstating the costs.191 If decisions had been based on
these estimates, the nation would have experienced a severe welfare loss due to
excessive levels of pollution. There is no reason to believe that state regulators
would produce more accurate assessments. Thus, even if cost-benefit analysis
provides the “right” method for determining the optimal level of air quality in
theory, a pragmatic alternative may be to adopt a health-based standard and
hope for the best.192
Moreover, to base decisions on health criteria alone, as is mandated by the
Clean Air Act, is not “irrational” merely because the short-term costs and
benefits do not yield a conclusion that such standards are “efficient,” even if
methodological difficulties with cost-benefit analysis could be acceptably
resolved. The architects of the Clean Air Act believed, as do perhaps most
citizens, that, when pressed, polluters will find effective ways to control
pollutant emissions at reasonable costs.193 Thus, the statute has consistently
been described as adopting a “technology-forcing” strategy to air quality
problems.194 Noting that such a strategy can be sensible, Justice Breyer, in
Whitman v. American Trucking, stated:
Technology-forcing hopes can prove realistic. Those persons, for example,
who opposed the 1970 Act’s insistence on a 90% reduction in auto emission
pollutants, on the ground of excessive cost, saw the development of catalytic
converter technology that helped achieve substantial reductions without the
economic catastrophe that some had feared. . . .
At the same time, the statute’s technology-forcing objective makes
regulatory efforts to determine the costs of implementation both less important
and more difficult. It means that the relevant economic costs are speculative,
for they include the cost of unknown future technologies. It also means that
efforts to take costs into account can breed time-consuming and potentially
unresolvable arguments about the accuracy and significance of cost estimates.

191. See id. at 600.
192. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 181, at 302 (noting that health-based standards
“might make sense on more pragmatic grounds in circumstances in which the policy-making
entity has relatively good information about the relationship between various levels of exposure
and resulting harm to health or the environment (i.e., a well-defined dose-response curve), but not
much information about the costs of employing alternative technological fixes”).
193. Whitman, 121 S. Ct. at 922-23 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing technology-forcing
strategy of the Clean Air Act).
194. Id.; see also Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976) (stating that the Clean
Air Act was “expressly designed to force regulated sources to develop pollution control [***58]
devices that might at the time appear to be economically or technologically infeasible.”). For a
discussion of the technology-forcing strategy of environmental law, see D. Bruce La Pierre,
Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771
(1977).
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Congress could have thought such efforts not worth the delays and
uncertainties that would accompany them.195

If one of the objectives of environmental policy is to reduce “wasteful”
uses of our natural resources—an objective that economists and others might
both support with enthusiasm—technology-forcing through health-based
standards may be an important and appropriate policy choice.
In
environmental matters, costs and benefits often cannot be meaningfully
assessed, making it difficult to frame policy choices in terms of marginal
analysis—i.e., the point at which the benefits of the next increment of
improvement in environmental quality are equal to the costs of achieving that
increment.196 Accordingly, “satisficing” rather than “optimizing” solutions are
called for.197 In the absence of some restriction on pollution-generating
activities, polluters simply have few incentives to invest in innovation to
reduce the amount and kinds of pollution that is generated. With regulation,
polluters are faced with added costs—costs that profit-maximizing entities will
seek to reduce.
Greater investment in developing pollution-reducing
innovations thus becomes a profit-maximizing strategy; such investment may
drive more rapid technological change that lowers overall costs:
[R]egulation provides or requires the generation of information; since
information is a public good it may be underprovided without such
incentives. . . . [Additionally, r]egulation reduces uncertainty about the payoffs
to investments in environmental innovation. There may be potential
investments that are believed to be profitable in an expected value sense, and
also deliver environmental benefits, but which are highly risky in the absence
of regulation that ensures that the environmental benefits are also privately
valuable. Regulation, in effect, provides ‘insurance’ against the risk of
investing in new technology, part of whose benefit cannot be internalized. . . .
[Moreover] technology that is initially more costly may produce long-run
competitive advantage, because of learning-by-doing or other “first-mover”
advantages . . . . Finally, regulation simply creates pressure. Such pressure
plays an important role in the innovation process, “to overcome inertia, foster
creative thinking and mitigate agency problems.”198

195. Whitman, 121 S. Ct. at 922-23 (Breyer, J., concurring).
196. See Swire, supra note 17, at 95-98 (discussing measurement problems).
197. On “satisficing,” as distinguished from “optimizing,” see Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law
and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1075-76 (2000).
198. Adam B. Jaffe, et al., “Technological Change and the Environment,” paper prepared as a
chapter of THE HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (Karl-Göran Mäler & Jeffrey
Vincent, eds., forthcoming), pp. 21-26 (quoting M.E. Porter & C. van der Linde, Toward a New
Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 97, 98
(1995)), available at Social Science Electronic Research Library, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?cfid=790370&cftoken=39052807&abstract_id=24585 (posted Oct. 13, 2000); see
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Minimum federal air quality standards can importantly influence
incentives for technological innovation. First, if these standards are backed by
consistently applied federal sanctions on states that fail to achieve the federal
standards,199 state regulators have an incentive to devise pollution control
strategies that achieve the standards while imposing the least net costs on their
citizens. In theory, this will encourage states to invest in innovative regulatory
strategies to a greater extent than they would in the absence of a federal
mandate. In this sense, the “cooperative federalism” structure of the original
Clean Air Act itself can be viewed as an exercise in “technology-forcing” in
the realm of state regulatory programs. In the absence of a federal mandate,
state regulators might conclude too quickly that strict environmental standards
are infeasible for economic or other reasons. Admittedly, the current Clean
Air Act radically restricts this potential by imposing extensive control
Arguably, these
requirements on states with nonattainment areas.200
requirements would be unnecessary if federal sanctions were applied
consistently and aggressively.
Second, federal standards may minimize the disincentive for innovation
provided by an state “voice” or “exit” option—i.e., avoiding pollution controls
through concessions gained from the states or by re-locating to another
jurisdiction. While this effect is somewhat speculative, given the states’
discretion to distribute the clean-up burden, the general direction of the
incentive effects created by federal minimum standards would likely tend
toward greater investment in innovation on the part of regulated firms than
would occur in the absence of such standards. Given the uncertain—yet, quite
remarkable—pace of technological innovation, it is not at all fanciful to
suggest that the incentives created by minimum national ambient air quality
standards will eventually make clear that attaining them is not only a bargain,
but in some circumstances a “win-win” solution. On this view, “regulation
may lead to ‘innovation offsets’ that can not only lower the net cost of meeting
environmental regulations, but can even lead to absolute advantages over
firms . . . not subject to similar regulations.’”201
CONCLUSION
Professor Stewart has recently concluded that, because the American
public views environmental quality as a “national good,” the usual criticisms

also Alan S. Miller, Environmental Regulation, Technological Innovation, and TechnologyForcing, NAT. RES. & ENVTL., Fall 1995, at 64.
199. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(c) (authorizing federal implementation plan as substitute for
inadequate state plans); 7410(m) (discretionary sanctions); 7509 (mandatory sanctions).
200. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7511a (plan requirements for ozone nonattainment areas).
201. Jaffee et al., supra note 198, at 24 (quoting Porter & C. Van der Linde, at 98 (1995)).
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of federal environmental regulation advanced by critics who employ “the usual
assumptions of the welfare economic/optimal environmental jurisdictional
analysis” are somewhat off-target.202 Instead, given the strong support for the
current federal regulatory structure on the part of the public, “environmental
programs should presumptively be federal unless ‘centralization failure’
dictates decentralization.”203
Treating air quality as a national good is consistent with the environmental
character of many air quality problems, which involve extensive interstate
pollution. Even for pollutants that do not travel long distances, many large
urban areas straddle state lines, making a state-centered approach to air quality
a terribly inefficient alternative, given the high transactions costs of securing
agreement between states on appropriate goals for air quality regulation and,
especially, the manner in which control obligations should be distributed as
between the states. In the end, however, the best justification for national
ambient air quality standards is that the vast majority of citizens have come to
view the goals represented by such standards as an appropriate constraint on
our willingness to secure short-term economic advantages at the cost of longterm environmental health. Minimum federal air quality standards exude a
national optimism about our ability to innovate and achieve desirable natural
environments while enjoying a vibrant, sustainable economy. While the
continuing extent of ozone nonattainment casts some doubt on whether such
technological optimism is warranted, a longer-term perspective may suggest
otherwise. In the three decades since the enactment of the 1970 Clean Air Act
and the decade since the 1990 amendments, much progress has been made.
The clear motive force of that progress has been a strong federal role. While
devolution may be attractive in theory, prudence may warrant a bit more
patience with federal air quality regulation than the critics have been willing to
endure.

202. See Stewart, National Good, supra note 17, at 212.
203. Id. at 213.

